1 00:00:41,000 --> 00:00:41,600 Hi, everyone. 2 00:00:41,960 --> 00:00:42,981 Thanks for joining us. 3 00:00:43,220 --> 00:00:44,521 My name is Dave Moss. 4 00:00:44,862 --> 00:00:45,642 I am Director of 5 00:00:45,682 --> 00:00:46,722 Investigations at the 6 00:00:46,762 --> 00:00:48,762 Electronic Frontier Foundation. 7 00:00:49,442 --> 00:00:50,143 We're going to start with a 8 00:00:50,182 --> 00:00:52,402 few housekeeping things. 9 00:00:52,423 --> 00:00:53,442 We'll be recording this 10 00:00:53,482 --> 00:00:55,064 session and only video of 11 00:00:55,103 --> 00:00:56,944 our speakers will be included. 12 00:00:58,003 --> 00:00:58,863 You can join us now in the 13 00:00:58,884 --> 00:01:00,704 official chat via Twitch at 14 00:01:00,984 --> 00:01:04,465 EFF.org slash live stream. 15 00:01:04,944 --> 00:01:05,305 Once again, 16 00:01:05,325 --> 00:01:08,585 that's EFF.org slash live stream. 17 00:01:09,331 --> 00:01:10,412 Please feel free to drop 18 00:01:10,453 --> 00:01:11,493 your questions into the 19 00:01:11,534 --> 00:01:12,795 chat throughout the program 20 00:01:13,094 --> 00:01:13,956 and our guests will answer 21 00:01:14,036 --> 00:01:15,736 as many as they can at the end. 22 00:01:16,617 --> 00:01:17,337 And if you're comfortable, 23 00:01:17,459 --> 00:01:18,599 you can type a hello in the 24 00:01:18,638 --> 00:01:20,721 chat window right now and 25 00:01:20,760 --> 00:01:21,581 let us know what part of 26 00:01:21,602 --> 00:01:22,983 the world you're watching from. 27 00:01:23,462 --> 00:01:24,784 We'd love to know where 28 00:01:24,823 --> 00:01:25,644 people are coming from for 29 00:01:25,685 --> 00:01:26,646 these virtual events. 30 00:01:27,546 --> 00:01:28,466 For those of you who aren't 31 00:01:28,507 --> 00:01:29,087 familiar with the 32 00:01:29,108 --> 00:01:30,448 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 33 00:01:31,224 --> 00:01:34,266 EFF is a nonprofit whose technologists, 34 00:01:34,406 --> 00:01:35,427 activists and attorneys 35 00:01:35,447 --> 00:01:36,429 have been fighting for your 36 00:01:36,608 --> 00:01:38,189 online privacy and free 37 00:01:38,230 --> 00:01:40,010 speech since nineteen ninety. 38 00:01:40,792 --> 00:01:42,272 You are the reason that EFF 39 00:01:42,293 --> 00:01:43,914 can take on this important work. 40 00:01:43,974 --> 00:01:44,814 So if you'd like to help us 41 00:01:44,855 --> 00:01:46,335 in this fight to defend 42 00:01:46,355 --> 00:01:47,296 your digital freedoms, 43 00:01:47,816 --> 00:01:49,317 please consider donating at 44 00:01:49,498 --> 00:01:52,640 EFF dot org slash border support. 45 00:01:52,879 --> 00:01:55,121 That's EFF dot org slash border support. 46 00:01:56,320 --> 00:01:57,641 Before we get into it with 47 00:01:57,701 --> 00:02:00,804 our panelists and our host, Matthew, 48 00:02:01,525 --> 00:02:02,224 I'm just going to take you 49 00:02:02,245 --> 00:02:03,066 on a quick little 50 00:02:03,626 --> 00:02:06,688 presentation about EFF's work at the U.S. 51 00:02:11,151 --> 00:02:12,211 EFF has been doing work on 52 00:02:12,231 --> 00:02:13,913 the border for quite some time. 53 00:02:14,354 --> 00:02:16,014 But around twenty nineteen 54 00:02:16,055 --> 00:02:16,695 and twenty twenty, 55 00:02:16,735 --> 00:02:17,795 we really started to beef 56 00:02:17,836 --> 00:02:19,296 up our efforts to research 57 00:02:19,677 --> 00:02:20,437 what surveillance 58 00:02:20,457 --> 00:02:21,799 technology was actually 59 00:02:21,818 --> 00:02:23,060 being deployed at the border. 60 00:02:23,800 --> 00:02:24,861 We had some big plans in 61 00:02:24,901 --> 00:02:26,263 twenty twenty to do this 62 00:02:26,603 --> 00:02:27,984 massive trip along the border. 63 00:02:28,764 --> 00:02:29,503 But as you know, 64 00:02:29,824 --> 00:02:30,884 plans changed in twenty 65 00:02:30,905 --> 00:02:31,966 twenty and we actually had 66 00:02:31,985 --> 00:02:33,247 to put them off for a little while. 67 00:02:33,366 --> 00:02:34,586 Didn't stop us researching, 68 00:02:34,867 --> 00:02:36,449 just stopped us going there in person. 69 00:02:36,868 --> 00:02:38,289 But starting in twenty twenty two, 70 00:02:38,349 --> 00:02:39,830 we started doing these 71 00:02:40,191 --> 00:02:42,271 really in-depth trips along the border. 72 00:02:43,138 --> 00:02:44,659 Um, we did three main ones. 73 00:02:45,060 --> 00:02:45,240 Um, 74 00:02:45,620 --> 00:02:47,201 but as you can see from this map where 75 00:02:47,222 --> 00:02:48,021 I've mapped out all the 76 00:02:48,042 --> 00:02:49,563 places that we've been, uh, 77 00:02:49,683 --> 00:02:50,664 meeting with people, 78 00:02:50,844 --> 00:02:52,325 whether that's activists or 79 00:02:52,385 --> 00:02:54,367 journalists or humanitarian groups, 80 00:02:54,764 --> 00:02:56,204 or even with law enforcement. 81 00:02:56,243 --> 00:02:57,685 We did site visits to 82 00:02:58,504 --> 00:03:00,064 surveillance installations, 83 00:03:00,104 --> 00:03:01,425 surveillance headquarters, 84 00:03:01,944 --> 00:03:03,445 and we actually just drove 85 00:03:03,466 --> 00:03:04,586 the border trying to see 86 00:03:04,645 --> 00:03:05,286 what people are 87 00:03:05,306 --> 00:03:06,526 encountering in the communities. 88 00:03:06,825 --> 00:03:08,467 And we've captured most of the border. 89 00:03:08,947 --> 00:03:09,866 There's still some places we 90 00:03:09,887 --> 00:03:10,526 need to get to, 91 00:03:10,847 --> 00:03:11,667 but it's been a pretty 92 00:03:12,388 --> 00:03:13,147 interesting journey. 93 00:03:14,448 --> 00:03:15,247 I want to talk about some of 94 00:03:15,268 --> 00:03:16,568 the outcomes that have come 95 00:03:16,608 --> 00:03:18,329 from these trips that we've 96 00:03:18,348 --> 00:03:19,068 taken to the border. 97 00:03:19,745 --> 00:03:20,526 Right off the bat, 98 00:03:21,086 --> 00:03:22,146 we had this mission to take 99 00:03:22,167 --> 00:03:24,868 as many photos as possible 100 00:03:25,049 --> 00:03:26,509 of surveillance infrastructure. 101 00:03:26,810 --> 00:03:27,911 And one of the reasons is 102 00:03:27,931 --> 00:03:28,731 that we noticed that 103 00:03:28,831 --> 00:03:30,293 researchers and journalists 104 00:03:30,612 --> 00:03:31,514 are often having to go 105 00:03:31,593 --> 00:03:34,616 straight to the CBP, to CBP and U.S. 106 00:03:34,656 --> 00:03:35,217 Border Patrol, 107 00:03:35,276 --> 00:03:36,818 and getting images from them 108 00:03:37,638 --> 00:03:38,538 for their stories. 109 00:03:40,080 --> 00:03:41,741 CBP to control the narrative. 110 00:03:42,080 --> 00:03:42,881 Sometimes they actually have 111 00:03:42,901 --> 00:03:43,721 to go pay money to get 112 00:03:43,801 --> 00:03:45,961 images from Getty from, you know, 113 00:03:46,062 --> 00:03:47,163 and it's the same images 114 00:03:47,282 --> 00:03:48,182 over and over again. 115 00:03:48,223 --> 00:03:51,063 So we wanted to provide, you know, 116 00:03:51,564 --> 00:03:53,384 an ad to the Wikimedia Commons, 117 00:03:53,866 --> 00:03:55,445 all of these like resources 118 00:03:55,485 --> 00:03:56,467 that people can pull from 119 00:03:56,486 --> 00:03:59,807 in their own research. 120 00:03:59,848 --> 00:04:01,588 We've also been mapping out 121 00:04:02,128 --> 00:04:04,110 surveillance along the US-Mexico border. 122 00:04:04,150 --> 00:04:06,991 So we currently have a map at EFF.org. 123 00:04:08,078 --> 00:04:10,919 where you can see all of the 124 00:04:10,960 --> 00:04:12,100 specific locations of 125 00:04:12,161 --> 00:04:13,181 surveillance towers. 126 00:04:13,201 --> 00:04:14,022 And as of now, 127 00:04:14,062 --> 00:04:14,962 I think we have about five 128 00:04:15,002 --> 00:04:16,043 hundred fifty surveillance 129 00:04:16,064 --> 00:04:17,384 towers mapped out their 130 00:04:17,425 --> 00:04:18,526 precise coordinates, 131 00:04:18,925 --> 00:04:19,987 along with images that you 132 00:04:20,007 --> 00:04:21,548 can you can click through 133 00:04:21,569 --> 00:04:22,889 to see what they actually look like. 134 00:04:23,569 --> 00:04:24,750 But we also have done all 135 00:04:24,870 --> 00:04:25,911 the license plate readers 136 00:04:26,052 --> 00:04:27,593 and checkpoints and ports of entry, 137 00:04:27,973 --> 00:04:29,735 as well as the aerostats 138 00:04:29,774 --> 00:04:30,435 along the border. 139 00:04:30,475 --> 00:04:32,076 And these are our spy blinks 140 00:04:32,096 --> 00:04:34,137 that fly over cities and rural areas. 141 00:04:36,896 --> 00:04:38,458 We also were a founding 142 00:04:38,497 --> 00:04:40,620 member of the coalition 143 00:04:40,660 --> 00:04:42,360 called Migranci Vigilancia. 144 00:04:43,161 --> 00:04:45,862 This is a group of a lot of organizations. 145 00:04:46,004 --> 00:04:48,764 It's led by Access Now to 146 00:04:48,805 --> 00:04:51,086 protect the human rights of 147 00:04:51,427 --> 00:04:53,848 migrants throughout North 148 00:04:53,869 --> 00:04:55,550 and South America when it 149 00:04:55,589 --> 00:04:57,071 comes to digital privacy 150 00:04:57,250 --> 00:04:58,052 and surveillance. 151 00:04:58,711 --> 00:04:59,632 And we recently were 152 00:04:59,692 --> 00:05:01,634 co-authors of a report on 153 00:05:02,795 --> 00:05:04,976 privacy and displacement for migrants. 154 00:05:07,625 --> 00:05:07,786 Now, 155 00:05:07,927 --> 00:05:08,947 one of the things that we've done over 156 00:05:08,987 --> 00:05:09,307 the years, 157 00:05:09,326 --> 00:05:11,028 we don't just go to the border. 158 00:05:11,528 --> 00:05:13,108 We also go to the Border 159 00:05:13,129 --> 00:05:15,589 Security Expo most years. 160 00:05:15,930 --> 00:05:17,750 This is like the Comic Con 161 00:05:17,790 --> 00:05:18,692 of border security. 162 00:05:18,711 --> 00:05:20,072 They have a huge showroom 163 00:05:20,132 --> 00:05:21,153 full of all the different 164 00:05:21,192 --> 00:05:22,774 technologies that tech 165 00:05:22,793 --> 00:05:23,713 companies are trying to 166 00:05:23,814 --> 00:05:26,995 sell to border enforcement. 167 00:05:28,317 --> 00:05:30,360 And we have taken all that 168 00:05:30,399 --> 00:05:31,480 information over the last 169 00:05:31,500 --> 00:05:33,322 few years and built a data 170 00:05:33,403 --> 00:05:38,750 set of the vendors and the materials, 171 00:05:38,790 --> 00:05:39,511 what they're offering. 172 00:05:40,764 --> 00:05:41,466 One of the other things that 173 00:05:41,505 --> 00:05:43,766 we have right now is a zine 174 00:05:43,947 --> 00:05:44,927 of the various border 175 00:05:44,947 --> 00:05:46,048 surveillance technologies, 176 00:05:46,348 --> 00:05:47,949 kind of like a birdwatcher's guide. 177 00:05:48,591 --> 00:05:49,790 When we would visit the border, 178 00:05:49,812 --> 00:05:51,132 we have this binder that we 179 00:05:51,172 --> 00:05:52,913 printed out ourselves of 180 00:05:52,934 --> 00:05:53,514 all these different 181 00:05:53,553 --> 00:05:56,036 technologies that we were looking for. 182 00:05:56,156 --> 00:05:58,057 And every time we met with somebody, 183 00:05:58,096 --> 00:05:58,997 they were really curious 184 00:05:59,038 --> 00:06:00,017 about this binder and they 185 00:06:00,057 --> 00:06:00,879 would flip through it. 186 00:06:01,238 --> 00:06:02,300 And we realized that needed 187 00:06:02,339 --> 00:06:03,560 to be a resource that we 188 00:06:03,581 --> 00:06:04,600 could put into the world. 189 00:06:04,961 --> 00:06:05,942 And so we have this both in 190 00:06:06,021 --> 00:06:06,822 English and Spanish. 191 00:06:07,398 --> 00:06:08,519 And for the first time today, 192 00:06:08,579 --> 00:06:09,519 we are actually offering 193 00:06:09,560 --> 00:06:13,942 these hard copies through our EFF store. 194 00:06:14,184 --> 00:06:15,204 We've given out hundreds of 195 00:06:15,225 --> 00:06:16,264 these along the border, 196 00:06:16,846 --> 00:06:18,047 but now you can get one yourself, 197 00:06:18,127 --> 00:06:19,247 even if you aren't based 198 00:06:19,288 --> 00:06:19,947 along the border. 199 00:06:20,769 --> 00:06:22,189 But like all EFF content, 200 00:06:22,790 --> 00:06:24,112 it is available under the 201 00:06:24,132 --> 00:06:25,213 Creative Commons license. 202 00:06:25,252 --> 00:06:26,814 You can find it elsewhere on our website. 203 00:06:28,142 --> 00:06:28,903 And then finally, 204 00:06:29,362 --> 00:06:30,524 the reason we're here today 205 00:06:30,704 --> 00:06:32,543 is to celebrate our new 206 00:06:32,624 --> 00:06:34,625 exhibit that was installed 207 00:06:34,805 --> 00:06:36,285 or that was opened just 208 00:06:36,345 --> 00:06:38,365 yesterday at the historic U.S. 209 00:06:38,386 --> 00:06:40,225 Immigration Station at Angel 210 00:06:40,326 --> 00:06:41,326 Island State Park. 211 00:06:41,846 --> 00:06:42,607 This exhibit, 212 00:06:42,826 --> 00:06:44,387 which includes a series of 213 00:06:44,447 --> 00:06:47,028 panels featuring the photos 214 00:06:47,048 --> 00:06:48,749 we've collected as well as 215 00:06:49,048 --> 00:06:49,928 imparting the knowledge 216 00:06:49,949 --> 00:06:50,668 that we've gathered, 217 00:06:50,949 --> 00:06:52,709 is called Border Surveillance Places, 218 00:06:52,769 --> 00:06:53,889 People and Technology. 219 00:06:54,230 --> 00:06:55,589 It covers a whole range of 220 00:06:55,670 --> 00:06:57,430 facets and layers of technology 221 00:06:59,088 --> 00:06:59,867 as we've seen along the 222 00:06:59,887 --> 00:07:00,809 U.S.-Mexico border. 223 00:07:01,528 --> 00:07:04,471 And this was spearheaded by 224 00:07:04,951 --> 00:07:06,653 our senior policy analyst, Matthew, 225 00:07:06,673 --> 00:07:07,432 who's going to be talking 226 00:07:07,452 --> 00:07:10,375 to you in just a moment. 227 00:07:10,595 --> 00:07:11,615 And we're just about to get 228 00:07:11,675 --> 00:07:12,315 into the panel. 229 00:07:12,656 --> 00:07:13,377 And so with that, 230 00:07:13,416 --> 00:07:15,959 I'd like to welcome our speakers. 231 00:07:17,500 --> 00:07:20,401 So first up, we have Matthew Gorglia, 232 00:07:20,521 --> 00:07:21,963 our senior policy analyst 233 00:07:22,882 --> 00:07:24,605 here at Electronic Frontier Foundation. 234 00:07:24,625 --> 00:07:26,826 We have 235 00:07:27,302 --> 00:07:28,245 Todd Miller, 236 00:07:28,987 --> 00:07:30,250 co-founder of the Border 237 00:07:30,290 --> 00:07:31,975 Chronicle and one of my 238 00:07:32,495 --> 00:07:34,822 heroes when it comes to US 239 00:07:34,841 --> 00:07:36,026 border surveillance research. 240 00:07:36,958 --> 00:07:37,999 We have Pedro Rios, 241 00:07:38,038 --> 00:07:39,040 who's director of the 242 00:07:39,060 --> 00:07:42,062 American Friends Service Committee, sorry, 243 00:07:42,081 --> 00:07:42,661 the American Friends 244 00:07:42,701 --> 00:07:43,262 Service Committee's 245 00:07:43,322 --> 00:07:44,742 U.S.-Mexico Border Program. 246 00:07:44,983 --> 00:07:46,504 Definitely one of my go-tos 247 00:07:46,745 --> 00:07:48,125 on advocacy in this area. 248 00:07:48,605 --> 00:07:49,547 And then Petra Molnar, 249 00:07:49,726 --> 00:07:51,427 author of The Walls Have Eyes, 250 00:07:51,887 --> 00:07:53,228 Surviving Migration in the 251 00:07:53,369 --> 00:07:54,670 Age of Artificial Intelligence. 252 00:07:54,689 --> 00:07:56,951 If I didn't have this Mexican background, 253 00:07:57,372 --> 00:07:58,992 Nogales, U.S.-Mexico Border, 254 00:07:59,033 --> 00:07:59,752 you would see her book 255 00:07:59,812 --> 00:08:01,254 right on the shelf behind me. 256 00:08:02,295 --> 00:08:03,456 And she's also the associate 257 00:08:03,475 --> 00:08:05,276 director of the Refugee Law Lab. 258 00:08:07,175 --> 00:08:08,315 take a little step away and 259 00:08:08,355 --> 00:08:11,716 let Matthew take over the discussion. 260 00:08:11,737 --> 00:08:12,298 Hi, everybody. 261 00:08:12,577 --> 00:08:13,937 Thank you for that introduction, Dave, 262 00:08:13,958 --> 00:08:14,737 and thank you all to our 263 00:08:14,757 --> 00:08:15,959 wonderful panelists for 264 00:08:15,999 --> 00:08:17,098 being here and for all you 265 00:08:17,158 --> 00:08:18,540 viewers tuning in. 266 00:08:19,060 --> 00:08:21,180 I guess I'd like to jump in 267 00:08:21,740 --> 00:08:23,261 as soon as we can and start 268 00:08:23,300 --> 00:08:24,161 by saying you've all been 269 00:08:24,422 --> 00:08:26,661 studying surveillance and 270 00:08:26,701 --> 00:08:28,002 the U.S.-Mexico border for 271 00:08:28,142 --> 00:08:29,423 quite a while now. 272 00:08:30,543 --> 00:08:31,624 You know, in my other life, 273 00:08:31,764 --> 00:08:33,364 I am a historian of 274 00:08:33,464 --> 00:08:35,225 immigration and surveillance and 275 00:08:35,284 --> 00:08:35,705 policing. 276 00:08:36,086 --> 00:08:37,427 And so just in your own 277 00:08:37,626 --> 00:08:38,847 experience in your own lives, 278 00:08:38,888 --> 00:08:39,849 I was wondering if you 279 00:08:39,889 --> 00:08:40,929 could give us a kind of 280 00:08:41,049 --> 00:08:42,890 sense of either continuity 281 00:08:42,931 --> 00:08:44,392 or change over time since 282 00:08:44,412 --> 00:08:45,273 you've been working on the 283 00:08:45,312 --> 00:08:46,274 US Mexico border. 284 00:08:46,594 --> 00:08:48,054 Have things been changing? 285 00:08:48,174 --> 00:08:49,937 Is there more continuity that you see? 286 00:08:50,216 --> 00:08:51,357 It's just the technology 287 00:08:51,378 --> 00:08:53,620 that evolves or really 288 00:08:53,919 --> 00:08:56,542 what's what's new and what's not so new, 289 00:08:56,642 --> 00:08:56,961 I guess. 290 00:08:57,001 --> 00:08:58,043 And we can we can start with 291 00:08:58,123 --> 00:08:59,945 Pedro and then follow up with Todd. 292 00:09:02,364 --> 00:09:03,504 Thank you, Matthew, 293 00:09:03,524 --> 00:09:04,384 and it's a pleasure to be 294 00:09:04,424 --> 00:09:05,025 here with all of you. 295 00:09:05,885 --> 00:09:07,748 I would say that, you know, 296 00:09:07,768 --> 00:09:09,028 we've gone a long way from 297 00:09:09,269 --> 00:09:10,529 when I started doing some 298 00:09:10,549 --> 00:09:11,289 of this work in the mid 299 00:09:11,350 --> 00:09:13,572 nineties and what would 300 00:09:15,153 --> 00:09:16,573 what one could describe as 301 00:09:16,614 --> 00:09:17,313 being the surveillance 302 00:09:17,333 --> 00:09:18,595 technology at that point 303 00:09:18,735 --> 00:09:20,035 where the ground sensors 304 00:09:20,056 --> 00:09:21,476 that Border Patrol would 305 00:09:21,596 --> 00:09:23,077 use to detect when there 306 00:09:23,118 --> 00:09:25,080 were border crossers in 307 00:09:25,639 --> 00:09:26,780 whatever region that there 308 00:09:26,801 --> 00:09:27,120 might have been. 309 00:09:27,181 --> 00:09:28,022 And some of these ground 310 00:09:28,062 --> 00:09:29,982 sensor technology was placed in both 311 00:09:30,557 --> 00:09:32,239 private and public land. 312 00:09:32,859 --> 00:09:34,679 And so it's a much more 313 00:09:35,019 --> 00:09:36,961 sophisticated endeavor now, 314 00:09:37,860 --> 00:09:39,922 obviously from issues 315 00:09:39,961 --> 00:09:41,263 related to DNA testing of 316 00:09:41,342 --> 00:09:43,443 migrants and to the extent 317 00:09:43,504 --> 00:09:46,164 where the DNA of migrants 318 00:09:46,666 --> 00:09:47,525 that's shared nationally 319 00:09:47,546 --> 00:09:48,706 with law enforcement in 320 00:09:48,765 --> 00:09:51,067 their database highly 321 00:09:51,107 --> 00:09:52,327 surpasses the number of 322 00:09:52,768 --> 00:09:53,788 people that were already 323 00:09:54,950 --> 00:09:55,809 in that database. 324 00:09:56,510 --> 00:09:58,572 The question that I like to 325 00:09:58,673 --> 00:10:00,214 explore more in the city 326 00:10:00,234 --> 00:10:01,875 where I live is the 327 00:10:02,115 --> 00:10:03,878 spillover of surveillance 328 00:10:03,898 --> 00:10:05,519 technologies into local 329 00:10:05,558 --> 00:10:07,801 jurisdictions and how local 330 00:10:07,821 --> 00:10:09,442 jurisdictions have adopted 331 00:10:10,302 --> 00:10:11,504 surveillance technologies as 332 00:10:11,524 --> 00:10:13,625 a way to define what they 333 00:10:13,664 --> 00:10:15,485 see as smart city progress. 334 00:10:15,946 --> 00:10:18,326 And that has been a lot of crossover, 335 00:10:18,407 --> 00:10:19,327 especially when there is 336 00:10:19,368 --> 00:10:20,508 sharing of information, 337 00:10:21,068 --> 00:10:21,769 whether it's done 338 00:10:21,828 --> 00:10:22,950 intentionally or whether 339 00:10:23,009 --> 00:10:24,630 it's an innocuous type of 340 00:10:24,650 --> 00:10:26,491 sharing of information with 341 00:10:27,011 --> 00:10:28,272 federal immigration agents, 342 00:10:28,371 --> 00:10:29,633 as occurred in the city where I live, 343 00:10:29,753 --> 00:10:30,793 the city of Chula Vista, 344 00:10:31,234 --> 00:10:32,434 which has been described as 345 00:10:32,514 --> 00:10:33,414 one of the most surveilled 346 00:10:33,455 --> 00:10:37,236 in the United States. 347 00:10:37,256 --> 00:10:38,477 Yeah. 348 00:10:38,518 --> 00:10:39,018 Thank you, Todd. 349 00:10:40,600 --> 00:10:44,081 yeah um yeah thanks uh and I 350 00:10:44,101 --> 00:10:45,423 just wanted to say quickly 351 00:10:45,462 --> 00:10:46,844 you know that just watching 352 00:10:46,864 --> 00:10:48,605 how much eff has done on 353 00:10:48,825 --> 00:10:49,926 this border on border 354 00:10:49,946 --> 00:10:50,986 surveillance has just been 355 00:10:51,027 --> 00:10:52,246 amazing it's been amazing 356 00:10:52,287 --> 00:10:52,827 work that I've been 357 00:10:52,868 --> 00:10:54,509 referencing for such a long 358 00:10:54,568 --> 00:10:56,149 time and it's such an honor 359 00:10:56,169 --> 00:10:57,230 to be with all of you 360 00:10:57,331 --> 00:10:59,831 matthew pedro and petra um 361 00:10:59,991 --> 00:11:01,873 all heroes of mine and dave 362 00:11:01,932 --> 00:11:03,134 too he's off in the 363 00:11:03,173 --> 00:11:05,515 background now um yeah I've 364 00:11:06,196 --> 00:11:07,716 uh just to piggyback off 365 00:11:07,836 --> 00:11:09,158 what taylor was saying um 366 00:11:10,057 --> 00:11:11,998 I've been looking at, 367 00:11:12,618 --> 00:11:14,418 I think I first came to the 368 00:11:14,458 --> 00:11:17,500 Nogales border in, 369 00:11:17,720 --> 00:11:20,081 which is the year after 370 00:11:20,160 --> 00:11:21,282 Operation Safeguard, 371 00:11:21,461 --> 00:11:22,822 which is basically your operation, 372 00:11:22,881 --> 00:11:25,283 gatekeeper operation, hold the line, 373 00:11:25,442 --> 00:11:26,423 those operations of the 374 00:11:26,464 --> 00:11:28,085 nineties of the Clinton administration. 375 00:11:28,684 --> 00:11:31,806 And, you know, seeing some of the first, 376 00:11:32,086 --> 00:11:32,346 you know, 377 00:11:32,426 --> 00:11:35,227 remnants of the model that we have now, 378 00:11:35,268 --> 00:11:37,008 the deterrence model and 379 00:11:37,048 --> 00:11:38,469 how it was built up 380 00:11:38,942 --> 00:11:41,023 from there you know like the 381 00:11:41,083 --> 00:11:42,884 wall building that you 382 00:11:43,044 --> 00:11:44,546 you'd see in the in the 383 00:11:44,885 --> 00:11:46,366 nineties and and the 384 00:11:46,827 --> 00:11:48,028 increasing personnel and 385 00:11:48,048 --> 00:11:48,788 putting them right on the 386 00:11:48,828 --> 00:11:50,149 border and also um 387 00:11:50,269 --> 00:11:52,250 technology was the third 388 00:11:52,311 --> 00:11:54,052 prong of this enforcement 389 00:11:54,092 --> 00:11:55,634 apparatus and just 390 00:11:55,673 --> 00:11:58,855 following you know how this has uh 391 00:11:59,460 --> 00:12:02,623 over the arc of what now what's it been? 392 00:12:02,663 --> 00:12:03,923 Thirty, thirty year. 393 00:12:03,984 --> 00:12:04,884 I think it's thirty years 394 00:12:04,924 --> 00:12:06,066 since Operation Gatekeeper 395 00:12:06,726 --> 00:12:08,869 on that anniversary, quote unquote, 396 00:12:08,889 --> 00:12:10,409 was in October. 397 00:12:11,451 --> 00:12:14,854 The the just I think often like 398 00:12:15,234 --> 00:12:16,575 You can look at it or you 399 00:12:16,596 --> 00:12:17,255 can just look at the 400 00:12:17,275 --> 00:12:18,417 budgets and the budgets 401 00:12:19,217 --> 00:12:22,081 tell a story that sometimes 402 00:12:22,120 --> 00:12:24,403 get missed in the national 403 00:12:24,423 --> 00:12:25,663 discourse around the border. 404 00:12:26,024 --> 00:12:26,945 And if you go back to like, 405 00:12:26,985 --> 00:12:28,245 nineteen ninety four, you know, 406 00:12:28,285 --> 00:12:29,226 you see a one point five 407 00:12:29,287 --> 00:12:31,208 billion dollar budget for 408 00:12:31,249 --> 00:12:32,850 border and immigration enforcement. 409 00:12:33,464 --> 00:12:35,885 And then you come to last year, 410 00:12:35,926 --> 00:12:36,807 two thousand twenty four, 411 00:12:36,886 --> 00:12:38,408 and it was over thirty billion dollars. 412 00:12:39,168 --> 00:12:40,629 If you look at Customs and 413 00:12:40,669 --> 00:12:41,971 Border Protection and 414 00:12:42,010 --> 00:12:42,932 Immigration and Customs 415 00:12:42,971 --> 00:12:44,653 Enforcement and those combined budgets. 416 00:12:45,053 --> 00:12:47,395 So looking over the span of 417 00:12:47,495 --> 00:12:49,557 the operations under in the 418 00:12:49,597 --> 00:12:51,119 nineties and then the post 419 00:12:51,158 --> 00:12:52,419 nine eleven and Department 420 00:12:52,440 --> 00:12:54,000 of Homeland Security and 421 00:12:54,020 --> 00:12:55,702 the implementation of 422 00:12:56,943 --> 00:12:58,725 SBINet or the Secure Border 423 00:12:58,745 --> 00:12:59,566 Initiative and the 424 00:12:59,625 --> 00:13:01,807 technology programs and 425 00:13:02,441 --> 00:13:04,102 the quote unquote virtual 426 00:13:04,163 --> 00:13:05,365 wall and the sort of 427 00:13:05,424 --> 00:13:07,067 intensification of 428 00:13:07,126 --> 00:13:09,590 contracts over the span of years, 429 00:13:10,530 --> 00:13:12,774 I think tells a pretty huge story. 430 00:13:13,193 --> 00:13:15,256 And one last point I wanna 431 00:13:15,297 --> 00:13:17,438 make on this is also that 432 00:13:18,519 --> 00:13:20,062 You'll see that technology 433 00:13:20,562 --> 00:13:22,202 is sometimes contextualized 434 00:13:22,243 --> 00:13:23,764 as the quote-unquote humane 435 00:13:23,825 --> 00:13:26,326 approach to border enforcement. 436 00:13:26,746 --> 00:13:27,847 And it's anything but. 437 00:13:27,908 --> 00:13:30,190 In fact, 438 00:13:30,210 --> 00:13:32,831 you could argue it's worse than a wall, 439 00:13:32,871 --> 00:13:33,832 but I'm not going to argue 440 00:13:33,852 --> 00:13:34,232 that right now. 441 00:13:34,253 --> 00:13:35,073 I'm just going to say it's 442 00:13:35,134 --> 00:13:36,554 part of the wall, right? 443 00:13:36,695 --> 00:13:38,796 And when you look at how 444 00:13:38,937 --> 00:13:40,177 it's even put by Border Patrol, 445 00:13:40,977 --> 00:13:43,240 they have the wall, the agents, 446 00:13:43,799 --> 00:13:45,662 and technology work hand in hand. 447 00:13:46,224 --> 00:13:47,445 the same sort of enforcement 448 00:13:47,485 --> 00:13:49,066 apparatus and you can kind 449 00:13:49,105 --> 00:13:51,989 of see that taking place uh 450 00:13:52,089 --> 00:14:00,875 right now thank you and 451 00:14:00,916 --> 00:14:02,157 perhaps just just to add 452 00:14:02,177 --> 00:14:03,317 briefly and and just to 453 00:14:03,378 --> 00:14:05,200 echo also uh what what todd 454 00:14:05,220 --> 00:14:06,179 said it's been really 455 00:14:06,220 --> 00:14:07,500 amazing to watch the work 456 00:14:07,542 --> 00:14:08,942 of eff over the last few 457 00:14:09,003 --> 00:14:09,822 years I would say 458 00:14:09,842 --> 00:14:10,964 particularly I want to 459 00:14:11,004 --> 00:14:12,706 highlight the visual elements of it 460 00:14:13,666 --> 00:14:15,626 both from an evidentiary perspective, 461 00:14:15,667 --> 00:14:17,447 but also I think what 462 00:14:17,467 --> 00:14:18,109 you're doing with this 463 00:14:18,168 --> 00:14:19,168 exhibit is brilliant 464 00:14:19,229 --> 00:14:19,869 because you're really 465 00:14:19,928 --> 00:14:21,309 bringing it into the 466 00:14:21,350 --> 00:14:22,471 community for people to 467 00:14:22,551 --> 00:14:24,011 engage with in a different 468 00:14:24,052 --> 00:14:25,852 way than perhaps they do 469 00:14:25,893 --> 00:14:27,092 with a book or an article. 470 00:14:27,153 --> 00:14:28,494 So really it's been 471 00:14:28,533 --> 00:14:30,315 wonderful to get to know 472 00:14:30,355 --> 00:14:31,414 you and to be in this 473 00:14:31,455 --> 00:14:32,336 conversation with you. 474 00:14:33,515 --> 00:14:35,277 I just wanted to add a bit 475 00:14:35,356 --> 00:14:37,158 to what Pedro and Todd have said. 476 00:14:38,846 --> 00:14:39,245 And, you know, 477 00:14:39,265 --> 00:14:40,167 I think history is so 478 00:14:40,206 --> 00:14:42,509 important in these conversations because, 479 00:14:42,528 --> 00:14:42,828 of course, 480 00:14:42,869 --> 00:14:44,910 we've been tracking this arc of 481 00:14:45,030 --> 00:14:46,432 this exponential increase 482 00:14:46,472 --> 00:14:47,994 of border technologies and 483 00:14:48,693 --> 00:14:49,455 the kind of growing 484 00:14:49,495 --> 00:14:51,657 violence as a result of so 485 00:14:51,677 --> 00:14:52,778 many of these high risk 486 00:14:52,837 --> 00:14:53,979 experimental projects. 487 00:14:54,038 --> 00:14:55,620 But at the end of the day, 488 00:14:55,941 --> 00:14:56,961 borders since their 489 00:14:56,980 --> 00:14:57,841 inception have been 490 00:14:57,881 --> 00:14:59,043 historically violent and 491 00:14:59,283 --> 00:15:00,804 they're predicated on power 492 00:15:00,845 --> 00:15:02,986 differentials and politics 493 00:15:03,027 --> 00:15:04,126 of exclusion and 494 00:15:04,168 --> 00:15:06,590 marginalization and systemic racism and 495 00:15:07,269 --> 00:15:08,870 ultimately about making 496 00:15:08,910 --> 00:15:10,472 determinations about who is 497 00:15:10,673 --> 00:15:13,195 a worthy person to enter versus not. 498 00:15:13,315 --> 00:15:15,476 And technologies are an 499 00:15:15,537 --> 00:15:17,018 exacerbation of this. 500 00:15:18,158 --> 00:15:20,081 And so I think it's important to, 501 00:15:20,140 --> 00:15:21,081 of course, hold, I think, 502 00:15:21,100 --> 00:15:23,582 this present moment in mind, given, again, 503 00:15:23,624 --> 00:15:24,904 this massive 504 00:15:24,945 --> 00:15:26,446 intensification of tech and 505 00:15:26,546 --> 00:15:28,508 money and the border industrial complex. 506 00:15:29,048 --> 00:15:29,889 But at the end of the day, 507 00:15:29,928 --> 00:15:31,830 this is also part of a 508 00:15:31,909 --> 00:15:32,990 series of policies that 509 00:15:33,030 --> 00:15:35,033 have been with us for centuries, really. 510 00:15:36,474 --> 00:15:37,014 Yeah, thank you. 511 00:15:37,034 --> 00:15:37,956 That is such a good point. 512 00:15:37,995 --> 00:15:40,918 The border is itself a kind of technology, 513 00:15:40,958 --> 00:15:41,119 right? 514 00:15:41,158 --> 00:15:42,341 It is something that creates 515 00:15:42,380 --> 00:15:44,243 categories of belonging and 516 00:15:44,302 --> 00:15:45,903 not belonging in and out, 517 00:15:46,524 --> 00:15:48,287 which then by their very 518 00:15:48,307 --> 00:15:49,528 nature have to be kind of 519 00:15:49,668 --> 00:15:51,730 enforced if they mean anything. 520 00:15:52,390 --> 00:15:53,432 That's a very good point. 521 00:15:53,451 --> 00:15:55,474 And so I guess the question is like, 522 00:15:55,514 --> 00:15:57,154 let's get into the technology. 523 00:15:57,535 --> 00:15:58,235 One of the things that 524 00:15:58,316 --> 00:16:00,618 motivated our team here at 525 00:16:00,677 --> 00:16:02,200 EFF was just when we got to 526 00:16:02,220 --> 00:16:03,139 the border and we could see 527 00:16:03,179 --> 00:16:04,061 just how many different 528 00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:05,783 types of technologies there are. 529 00:16:05,802 --> 00:16:07,464 And it inspired the great 530 00:16:07,504 --> 00:16:09,426 zine Dave was talking about. 531 00:16:09,745 --> 00:16:10,346 It inspired, 532 00:16:10,386 --> 00:16:11,567 we have a very big panel in 533 00:16:11,607 --> 00:16:12,828 the exhibit called the 534 00:16:12,869 --> 00:16:14,049 Taxonomy of Border 535 00:16:14,070 --> 00:16:15,530 Surveillance that kind of goes through 536 00:16:15,990 --> 00:16:17,370 some of the key categories 537 00:16:17,390 --> 00:16:18,532 and types of surveillance 538 00:16:18,552 --> 00:16:19,412 you're likely to see. 539 00:16:19,812 --> 00:16:20,451 So I was wondering if you 540 00:16:20,471 --> 00:16:21,812 could talk about not just 541 00:16:21,831 --> 00:16:23,432 the kind of diversity of 542 00:16:23,633 --> 00:16:26,192 actual devices that you can see, you know, 543 00:16:26,253 --> 00:16:28,673 within sometimes a hundred 544 00:16:28,714 --> 00:16:30,374 miles of the US-Mexico border, 545 00:16:31,073 --> 00:16:34,095 but also the overlapping jurisdictions, 546 00:16:34,195 --> 00:16:34,375 right? 547 00:16:34,394 --> 00:16:35,414 Because, you know, 548 00:16:35,455 --> 00:16:37,215 sometimes when you see a device, 549 00:16:37,235 --> 00:16:38,535 you don't really know who 550 00:16:38,556 --> 00:16:39,316 has deployed it. 551 00:16:39,395 --> 00:16:40,375 Is it county? 552 00:16:40,416 --> 00:16:41,096 Is it local? 553 00:16:41,196 --> 00:16:41,855 Is it state? 554 00:16:41,936 --> 00:16:42,756 Is it federal? 555 00:16:43,057 --> 00:16:44,677 Is it vigilante even? 556 00:16:45,538 --> 00:16:46,698 And so I was wondering if we 557 00:16:46,739 --> 00:16:48,542 could open up the floor 558 00:16:48,581 --> 00:16:49,342 here to talk a little bit 559 00:16:49,383 --> 00:16:52,547 about the diversity of not 560 00:16:52,567 --> 00:16:54,910 just devices and what they do, 561 00:16:55,230 --> 00:16:56,692 but also the diversity of 562 00:16:56,932 --> 00:16:58,475 agencies and bureaus that 563 00:16:58,495 --> 00:17:00,217 have put out those bureaucracies. 564 00:17:00,278 --> 00:17:01,559 Let's start with you, Petra. 565 00:17:04,833 --> 00:17:05,252 Sure. 566 00:17:05,792 --> 00:17:05,972 I mean, 567 00:17:06,034 --> 00:17:07,634 I think the way you're describing 568 00:17:07,693 --> 00:17:08,654 it really highlights that 569 00:17:08,694 --> 00:17:10,494 this is an ecosystem of so 570 00:17:10,535 --> 00:17:12,056 many different players that 571 00:17:12,215 --> 00:17:14,017 are involved in normalizing 572 00:17:14,076 --> 00:17:15,856 technology and presenting 573 00:17:15,916 --> 00:17:16,897 it as a solution to the 574 00:17:16,938 --> 00:17:18,337 so-called problem of migration. 575 00:17:18,439 --> 00:17:19,538 We're not just talking about 576 00:17:20,078 --> 00:17:22,319 public sector entities, 577 00:17:22,400 --> 00:17:23,800 but also the private sector, 578 00:17:23,840 --> 00:17:24,721 which is a major, 579 00:17:24,921 --> 00:17:26,701 major player in all of this. 580 00:17:27,442 --> 00:17:28,262 And also, 581 00:17:28,803 --> 00:17:30,064 I think a lot of it has to do 582 00:17:30,084 --> 00:17:30,785 with the fact that, 583 00:17:30,805 --> 00:17:31,766 and I will get into this a 584 00:17:31,786 --> 00:17:32,547 little bit later, 585 00:17:32,707 --> 00:17:33,867 and I know we're focusing 586 00:17:33,887 --> 00:17:36,569 on the US-Mexico context particularly, 587 00:17:36,589 --> 00:17:37,290 but this is also a 588 00:17:37,371 --> 00:17:38,731 transnational and a global 589 00:17:38,771 --> 00:17:40,252 issue with transnational 590 00:17:40,272 --> 00:17:42,075 players that are really 591 00:17:42,515 --> 00:17:43,576 setting the agenda and 592 00:17:43,615 --> 00:17:44,777 setting the stage in terms 593 00:17:44,817 --> 00:17:46,538 of what we innovate on and why. 594 00:17:47,338 --> 00:17:48,359 And in terms of the kind of 595 00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:49,721 taxonomy of technologies, 596 00:17:49,740 --> 00:17:51,383 I'm sure Todd and Pedro can 597 00:17:51,423 --> 00:17:52,763 speak to the specificities 598 00:17:52,903 --> 00:17:53,944 much more than I can. 599 00:17:54,505 --> 00:17:55,365 But it is a class of 600 00:17:55,425 --> 00:17:56,707 technologies that cross 601 00:17:56,747 --> 00:17:58,848 cuts the type of 602 00:17:58,929 --> 00:17:59,950 traditional surveillance 603 00:17:59,970 --> 00:18:02,352 that maybe people can think of drones, 604 00:18:02,432 --> 00:18:03,553 blimps, cameras. 605 00:18:04,133 --> 00:18:06,695 But it's also more experimental projects. 606 00:18:07,375 --> 00:18:09,178 We've heard of RoboDogs, for example, 607 00:18:09,198 --> 00:18:10,118 that were announced a few 608 00:18:10,159 --> 00:18:11,339 years ago by the Department 609 00:18:11,359 --> 00:18:12,421 of Homeland Security. 610 00:18:12,862 --> 00:18:13,761 But also things that are a 611 00:18:13,781 --> 00:18:15,604 little bit more hidden from view, 612 00:18:15,924 --> 00:18:17,306 a little bit less perhaps 613 00:18:17,506 --> 00:18:18,606 viscerally disturbing, 614 00:18:18,666 --> 00:18:20,148 but equally as important to 615 00:18:20,189 --> 00:18:20,989 pay attention to. 616 00:18:21,369 --> 00:18:22,191 That's things like 617 00:18:23,070 --> 00:18:24,752 discrimination through algorithms, 618 00:18:24,813 --> 00:18:25,554 for example, 619 00:18:25,693 --> 00:18:26,974 or using data sets that are 620 00:18:27,015 --> 00:18:28,256 shared indiscriminately. 621 00:18:29,416 --> 00:18:30,497 Sometimes I talk about this 622 00:18:30,517 --> 00:18:31,877 as kind of panopticon of 623 00:18:31,938 --> 00:18:33,577 migration management technologies, 624 00:18:33,637 --> 00:18:34,778 and that's really what it is. 625 00:18:34,798 --> 00:18:36,538 It essentially impacts a 626 00:18:36,598 --> 00:18:38,358 person on the move at every 627 00:18:38,398 --> 00:18:39,940 single juncture of their journey now. 628 00:18:42,059 --> 00:18:42,721 Yeah, Pedro. 629 00:18:42,740 --> 00:18:47,821 Yeah, and I think, 630 00:18:48,102 --> 00:18:49,261 and just kind of 631 00:18:49,561 --> 00:18:50,462 piggybacking a little bit 632 00:18:50,542 --> 00:18:51,823 on the violence that 633 00:18:52,619 --> 00:18:53,641 all the different types of 634 00:18:54,221 --> 00:18:55,622 surveillance systems cause. 635 00:18:56,242 --> 00:18:58,763 I reflect on the study that 636 00:18:58,804 --> 00:19:00,346 researchers did about the 637 00:19:01,685 --> 00:19:02,646 implementation of certain 638 00:19:02,666 --> 00:19:03,948 surveillance cameras along 639 00:19:04,228 --> 00:19:06,190 the border in Arizona and 640 00:19:06,210 --> 00:19:07,711 the tracking of migration 641 00:19:07,770 --> 00:19:09,491 routes and how that's 642 00:19:09,852 --> 00:19:12,054 tended to push people into 643 00:19:12,153 --> 00:19:14,134 much more remote desert 644 00:19:14,174 --> 00:19:15,816 terrains where the 645 00:19:16,016 --> 00:19:18,317 migration seemed to even 646 00:19:18,357 --> 00:19:19,538 take many more days and 647 00:19:19,942 --> 00:19:22,564 which caused a lot more loss of life. 648 00:19:23,084 --> 00:19:24,064 And so when we're 649 00:19:24,183 --> 00:19:25,943 considering what is much 650 00:19:26,064 --> 00:19:27,924 more visible out in the 651 00:19:27,964 --> 00:19:29,384 field of surveillance cameras, 652 00:19:29,404 --> 00:19:31,545 for instance, or towers, 653 00:19:31,766 --> 00:19:34,546 both mobile and the ones that are fixed, 654 00:19:35,326 --> 00:19:41,468 cause this omnipresent presence, 655 00:19:41,548 --> 00:19:43,607 for lack of a better way of describing it, 656 00:19:44,248 --> 00:19:46,048 of technologies that are 657 00:19:46,729 --> 00:19:47,929 constantly surveying 658 00:19:48,615 --> 00:19:48,994 people. 659 00:19:49,355 --> 00:19:50,256 And there have been, 660 00:19:51,156 --> 00:19:52,657 especially in southern Arizona, 661 00:19:52,837 --> 00:19:53,877 communities that have 662 00:19:53,998 --> 00:19:55,960 complained about being 663 00:19:56,019 --> 00:19:56,940 under watch of these 664 00:19:56,980 --> 00:19:59,362 surveillance towers and not 665 00:19:59,422 --> 00:20:00,522 knowing what sort of 666 00:20:01,303 --> 00:20:03,384 technology is being or what 667 00:20:03,403 --> 00:20:04,444 sort of data sets are being 668 00:20:05,125 --> 00:20:07,146 captured and for how long 669 00:20:07,186 --> 00:20:09,208 those data sets are being retained. 670 00:20:09,248 --> 00:20:12,009 And so along with what appears, 671 00:20:13,651 --> 00:20:16,972 what's visibly available for one to 672 00:20:17,833 --> 00:20:18,972 to be cognizant of, 673 00:20:19,253 --> 00:20:21,193 the retention period 674 00:20:21,673 --> 00:20:23,315 oftentimes is a problem as well. 675 00:20:23,634 --> 00:20:24,434 What gets captured? 676 00:20:24,494 --> 00:20:27,435 Who has access to those data sets? 677 00:20:27,756 --> 00:20:29,436 And for what purpose are they being used? 678 00:20:29,497 --> 00:20:31,238 We've learned in the past of 679 00:20:31,938 --> 00:20:33,597 data sets that ICE has held 680 00:20:34,098 --> 00:20:35,499 that have been breached and 681 00:20:35,538 --> 00:20:37,380 that information then, 682 00:20:37,420 --> 00:20:38,839 very sensitive information 683 00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:39,921 then is available to 684 00:20:41,141 --> 00:20:42,741 private individuals or 685 00:20:42,801 --> 00:20:46,742 private enterprises that might have other 686 00:20:47,726 --> 00:20:49,006 intentions for the use of 687 00:20:49,026 --> 00:20:49,826 that information. 688 00:20:50,386 --> 00:20:53,508 And I think looking at the 689 00:20:53,528 --> 00:20:54,807 question of future use of 690 00:20:54,827 --> 00:20:57,828 these data sets raises a 691 00:20:57,929 --> 00:20:59,788 lot more alarm for me, 692 00:21:00,249 --> 00:21:01,410 considering that the 693 00:21:01,490 --> 00:21:03,049 evolution of the technology 694 00:21:03,569 --> 00:21:05,070 is moving at a much more 695 00:21:05,770 --> 00:21:07,651 faster speed than any type 696 00:21:07,711 --> 00:21:11,772 of protections that we 697 00:21:11,813 --> 00:21:13,173 might want to have both under 698 00:21:13,894 --> 00:21:15,176 constitutional protections 699 00:21:15,237 --> 00:21:16,218 or civil rights or just 700 00:21:16,719 --> 00:21:23,406 simply questions around privacy. 701 00:21:23,507 --> 00:21:24,607 Yeah. 702 00:21:24,868 --> 00:21:25,549 Todd? 703 00:21:25,589 --> 00:21:27,811 Yeah, I remember, Matt, 704 00:21:29,094 --> 00:21:30,695 when you were in Nogales and 705 00:21:31,996 --> 00:21:33,817 I do believe the aerostat 706 00:21:34,017 --> 00:21:37,258 was up and running and it's 707 00:21:37,377 --> 00:21:39,179 complete omnipresence. 708 00:21:39,878 --> 00:21:41,200 You couldn't avoid, you know, 709 00:21:41,339 --> 00:21:42,621 when there's an aerostat or 710 00:21:42,681 --> 00:21:43,780 one of those surveillance blimps, 711 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:46,281 you just, it's always watched. 712 00:21:46,321 --> 00:21:47,321 Or at least the feeling, 713 00:21:47,502 --> 00:21:48,303 like Pedro was saying, 714 00:21:48,343 --> 00:21:50,923 of always being watched is 715 00:21:51,423 --> 00:21:53,444 And they eventually got rid of that. 716 00:21:53,605 --> 00:21:53,965 In fact, 717 00:21:54,046 --> 00:21:55,768 even the sheriff in Santa Cruz 718 00:21:56,147 --> 00:21:57,930 County was against that 719 00:21:58,891 --> 00:21:59,711 surveillance blimp. 720 00:22:00,071 --> 00:22:00,913 But also remember, 721 00:22:02,162 --> 00:22:03,041 There was a request for 722 00:22:03,122 --> 00:22:04,863 proposals and I think it 723 00:22:04,883 --> 00:22:05,903 was in two thousand 724 00:22:05,942 --> 00:22:07,702 eighteen that I just copy 725 00:22:08,343 --> 00:22:11,364 caught my eye and it was a 726 00:22:11,423 --> 00:22:13,144 request for proposals for a drone, 727 00:22:13,845 --> 00:22:15,845 a medium sized drone that 728 00:22:16,164 --> 00:22:18,066 was silent and also had 729 00:22:18,105 --> 00:22:19,425 facial recognition cameras 730 00:22:19,465 --> 00:22:20,306 so it could come down and 731 00:22:20,326 --> 00:22:21,806 take pictures of people's 732 00:22:21,865 --> 00:22:23,626 faces without them knowing. 733 00:22:24,207 --> 00:22:25,688 now I never never I've tried 734 00:22:25,708 --> 00:22:26,808 to follow that story I saw 735 00:22:26,828 --> 00:22:27,990 the request for proposals 736 00:22:28,049 --> 00:22:28,990 and then I knew that there 737 00:22:29,029 --> 00:22:30,691 were companies going there 738 00:22:30,730 --> 00:22:32,353 to to test some things out 739 00:22:32,393 --> 00:22:34,933 but I I've lost the thread 740 00:22:34,953 --> 00:22:36,194 of that story or whether 741 00:22:36,234 --> 00:22:37,175 there's such a thing that 742 00:22:37,236 --> 00:22:40,337 exists I'm not sure um and 743 00:22:40,958 --> 00:22:42,519 and also uh you know just 744 00:22:42,538 --> 00:22:43,700 to think of the 745 00:22:43,720 --> 00:22:45,260 crisscrossing jurisdictions 746 00:22:45,882 --> 00:22:47,863 um I I remember I went in 747 00:22:48,432 --> 00:22:50,454 Like, I think Petra, you know, 748 00:22:50,515 --> 00:22:52,836 described it well in this ecosystem, 749 00:22:52,875 --> 00:22:54,336 but it seems like it's an 750 00:22:54,416 --> 00:22:56,519 ecosystem that's mainly 751 00:22:56,558 --> 00:22:58,079 directed from the federal government, 752 00:22:58,119 --> 00:22:58,400 you know, 753 00:22:58,420 --> 00:22:59,480 when the federal government 754 00:22:59,540 --> 00:23:00,741 always lays the claim on 755 00:23:02,384 --> 00:23:04,885 They're in charge of border enforcement. 756 00:23:05,046 --> 00:23:07,047 But I do remember I was in 757 00:23:07,146 --> 00:23:08,926 Yuma and I was able to get 758 00:23:09,007 --> 00:23:10,508 access to their documents 759 00:23:10,528 --> 00:23:11,647 of Operation Stone Garden. 760 00:23:11,688 --> 00:23:12,708 And that's Department of 761 00:23:12,728 --> 00:23:13,749 Homeland Security money 762 00:23:14,108 --> 00:23:16,229 that they get for doing 763 00:23:16,249 --> 00:23:17,789 border surveillance. 764 00:23:17,930 --> 00:23:18,890 And it was interesting to 765 00:23:18,910 --> 00:23:20,631 watch what the Yuma Police 766 00:23:20,651 --> 00:23:22,570 Department was doing that 767 00:23:22,691 --> 00:23:24,451 in terms of they were saying, oh, 768 00:23:24,471 --> 00:23:25,652 we went to the swap meet 769 00:23:25,912 --> 00:23:27,173 and we're looking for people there. 770 00:23:27,192 --> 00:23:28,752 We went to the arroyo or the 771 00:23:28,893 --> 00:23:30,653 wash and we're looking for people there. 772 00:23:31,126 --> 00:23:33,308 You know, and then they said, oh, 773 00:23:33,449 --> 00:23:34,809 and we requested this 774 00:23:34,849 --> 00:23:36,070 technology because there's 775 00:23:36,151 --> 00:23:38,212 money for technologies. 776 00:23:38,252 --> 00:23:39,753 And apparently, you know, 777 00:23:40,755 --> 00:23:42,655 the police department and 778 00:23:42,675 --> 00:23:43,436 the federal government or 779 00:23:43,477 --> 00:23:45,459 CBP was going to work hand in hand. 780 00:23:46,038 --> 00:23:48,441 And then the other thing is Lone Star, 781 00:23:48,520 --> 00:23:48,740 right? 782 00:23:48,760 --> 00:23:50,442 You look at Operation Lone Star. 783 00:23:51,202 --> 00:23:52,624 And for the years of the 784 00:23:52,644 --> 00:23:53,664 four years of Biden, 785 00:23:53,704 --> 00:23:55,247 it was over in direct 786 00:23:55,666 --> 00:23:57,048 confrontation with the 787 00:23:57,167 --> 00:23:57,969 federal government. 788 00:23:58,429 --> 00:23:59,910 But I was I wonder, like, 789 00:23:59,970 --> 00:24:00,611 how much is that? 790 00:24:01,048 --> 00:24:03,130 true you know just going 791 00:24:03,250 --> 00:24:04,250 down and being spending 792 00:24:04,310 --> 00:24:05,271 some time on the Texas 793 00:24:05,311 --> 00:24:08,094 border and on like watching 794 00:24:08,134 --> 00:24:09,034 like on the Rio Grande and 795 00:24:09,054 --> 00:24:10,454 the Rio Grande Valley just 796 00:24:10,494 --> 00:24:12,175 watching patrol boats of 797 00:24:12,215 --> 00:24:13,257 the state government of the 798 00:24:13,277 --> 00:24:14,538 National Guard of the U.S. 799 00:24:14,597 --> 00:24:15,778 Border Patrol of the Coast 800 00:24:15,818 --> 00:24:18,220 Guard of the Texas Wildlife 801 00:24:18,240 --> 00:24:20,662 Service of the Florida State Police 802 00:24:21,519 --> 00:24:21,699 Yeah, 803 00:24:21,859 --> 00:24:23,784 all of them doing like patrols down 804 00:24:23,804 --> 00:24:24,525 the Rio Grande. 805 00:24:25,426 --> 00:24:27,289 The idea of who's doing what 806 00:24:27,371 --> 00:24:28,512 right now seems to be 807 00:24:29,114 --> 00:24:30,576 massively jumbled and the 808 00:24:30,676 --> 00:24:33,563 ecosystem is a bit all over the place. 809 00:24:35,402 --> 00:24:35,721 Yeah, 810 00:24:36,343 --> 00:24:38,144 and to build on something that you've 811 00:24:38,204 --> 00:24:39,786 all brought up already, 812 00:24:41,047 --> 00:24:42,167 the surveillance isn't a 813 00:24:42,208 --> 00:24:44,569 kind of philosophical harm, right? 814 00:24:44,650 --> 00:24:46,291 It is like not just, uh-oh, 815 00:24:46,412 --> 00:24:47,432 I'm being watched. 816 00:24:48,333 --> 00:24:51,276 It has real-world manifest harms involved. 817 00:24:51,635 --> 00:24:52,717 up until death. 818 00:24:53,238 --> 00:24:54,117 And I was wondering if you 819 00:24:54,138 --> 00:24:55,420 could all elaborate a 820 00:24:55,519 --> 00:24:57,260 little bit on the kind of 821 00:24:57,422 --> 00:24:59,303 real-world harms that are 822 00:24:59,363 --> 00:25:01,325 happening because of this 823 00:25:01,444 --> 00:25:02,626 massive buildup of 824 00:25:02,686 --> 00:25:03,807 infrastructure of surveillance, 825 00:25:04,407 --> 00:25:05,829 not just on the U.S.-Mexico border, 826 00:25:05,849 --> 00:25:07,310 but to bring in some of 827 00:25:07,351 --> 00:25:09,173 Petra's international work as well, 828 00:25:09,992 --> 00:25:10,493 but some of the 829 00:25:10,534 --> 00:25:11,714 surveillance that's being 830 00:25:11,755 --> 00:25:13,477 deployed in Southern Europe as well. 831 00:25:14,257 --> 00:25:15,719 Let's maybe start with Petra. 832 00:25:18,529 --> 00:25:19,170 Yeah, thanks. 833 00:25:19,290 --> 00:25:20,010 Thanks for asking that 834 00:25:20,050 --> 00:25:21,731 question because I think it's, you know, 835 00:25:21,751 --> 00:25:22,613 it's important to try and 836 00:25:22,653 --> 00:25:23,932 understand the actors and 837 00:25:24,034 --> 00:25:25,433 ecosystem and power. 838 00:25:25,795 --> 00:25:26,974 But at the end of the day, 839 00:25:27,175 --> 00:25:28,797 these technologies have 840 00:25:28,836 --> 00:25:30,377 real impact on people on 841 00:25:30,397 --> 00:25:32,199 the move and on communities. 842 00:25:33,134 --> 00:25:33,334 you know, 843 00:25:33,374 --> 00:25:34,654 whether we wanna analyze it from 844 00:25:34,694 --> 00:25:36,654 a human rights perspective and look at, 845 00:25:36,694 --> 00:25:36,974 you know, 846 00:25:37,015 --> 00:25:38,615 the infringements to the rights 847 00:25:38,675 --> 00:25:40,155 of privacy, for example, 848 00:25:40,215 --> 00:25:41,636 and sensitive data is being 849 00:25:41,696 --> 00:25:42,737 shared with repressive 850 00:25:42,777 --> 00:25:44,617 governments or the 851 00:25:44,637 --> 00:25:45,518 discrimination that's 852 00:25:45,557 --> 00:25:46,979 inherent in so many of the 853 00:25:47,058 --> 00:25:48,098 algorithms or facial 854 00:25:48,138 --> 00:25:49,940 recognition that states are using. 855 00:25:50,819 --> 00:25:51,921 Or perhaps most sharply, 856 00:25:51,961 --> 00:25:53,903 as Pedro already alluded to, 857 00:25:54,022 --> 00:25:55,285 the loss of life at the 858 00:25:55,325 --> 00:25:56,726 border as a result of these 859 00:25:56,766 --> 00:25:58,468 surveillance dragnets that 860 00:25:58,508 --> 00:26:01,210 instead of preventing people from coming, 861 00:26:01,289 --> 00:26:02,592 as states like to say, 862 00:26:02,672 --> 00:26:03,813 they push people into life 863 00:26:03,833 --> 00:26:04,634 threatening terrain, 864 00:26:05,034 --> 00:26:06,214 both in the Sonora Desert 865 00:26:06,255 --> 00:26:07,656 and at the US-Mexico border. 866 00:26:07,717 --> 00:26:08,636 But also we're seeing 867 00:26:08,698 --> 00:26:10,638 similar trends in the Mediterranean Sea, 868 00:26:10,679 --> 00:26:11,359 for example, 869 00:26:11,759 --> 00:26:12,780 as people are making their 870 00:26:12,800 --> 00:26:15,084 way into European territory. 871 00:26:15,564 --> 00:26:16,505 or even along the land 872 00:26:16,525 --> 00:26:17,987 border of Evros between 873 00:26:18,047 --> 00:26:18,949 Greece and Turkey. 874 00:26:20,029 --> 00:26:20,471 In my work, 875 00:26:20,510 --> 00:26:21,592 I've been trying to take a 876 00:26:21,632 --> 00:26:23,314 global perspective and I've 877 00:26:23,334 --> 00:26:24,335 been really lucky to be 878 00:26:24,355 --> 00:26:26,337 able to work and sometimes 879 00:26:26,377 --> 00:26:28,240 even live in places where a 880 00:26:28,280 --> 00:26:29,442 lot of this tech is being 881 00:26:29,501 --> 00:26:30,442 experimented with. 882 00:26:31,431 --> 00:26:32,971 You know, absolutely, Matthew, 883 00:26:33,291 --> 00:26:34,711 it's a global phenomenon 884 00:26:34,872 --> 00:26:38,192 where the impact of this 885 00:26:38,353 --> 00:26:41,354 tech is felt on virtually 886 00:26:41,453 --> 00:26:43,515 every aspect of the kind of 887 00:26:43,954 --> 00:26:45,154 human rights and the human 888 00:26:45,515 --> 00:26:47,175 gamut of what is happening. 889 00:26:47,675 --> 00:26:49,817 Not to also mention the 890 00:26:49,836 --> 00:26:50,997 conflation of military 891 00:26:51,057 --> 00:26:53,057 technology and the border 892 00:26:53,097 --> 00:26:54,278 industrial complex. 893 00:26:54,377 --> 00:26:55,958 We're oftentimes seeing that 894 00:26:56,057 --> 00:26:57,179 technologies that are 895 00:26:57,239 --> 00:26:59,058 developed for the purposes 896 00:26:59,098 --> 00:27:01,160 of warfare or in the context of 897 00:27:01,700 --> 00:27:03,161 context of Israel-Palestine 898 00:27:03,661 --> 00:27:04,842 for the continuation of the 899 00:27:04,882 --> 00:27:06,843 Gaza genocide technologies 900 00:27:06,863 --> 00:27:07,903 which started there and 901 00:27:07,943 --> 00:27:08,864 tested there and then 902 00:27:08,924 --> 00:27:10,204 exported for the purposes 903 00:27:10,244 --> 00:27:12,666 of border control in the 904 00:27:12,707 --> 00:27:14,048 European Union and at the 905 00:27:14,067 --> 00:27:15,008 US-Mexico border. 906 00:27:15,448 --> 00:27:16,709 So it's very important to, I think, 907 00:27:16,769 --> 00:27:18,730 take a broader approach to 908 00:27:18,990 --> 00:27:20,611 these issues and try and 909 00:27:20,671 --> 00:27:22,332 connect these stories 910 00:27:22,853 --> 00:27:24,012 across the world because 911 00:27:24,394 --> 00:27:26,275 the rise of technology 912 00:27:26,315 --> 00:27:27,655 that's harming people is 913 00:27:27,715 --> 00:27:29,596 absolutely a global phenomenon. 914 00:27:31,057 --> 00:27:31,557 Pedro, 915 00:27:31,577 --> 00:27:34,220 do we have a sense of the scale of 916 00:27:34,819 --> 00:27:36,401 harm and death that is 917 00:27:36,421 --> 00:27:38,442 being caused as more and 918 00:27:38,481 --> 00:27:39,561 more towers and more and 919 00:27:39,582 --> 00:27:40,643 more technology goes up and 920 00:27:40,663 --> 00:27:41,923 they're driving people into 921 00:27:41,982 --> 00:27:45,005 more remote parts of the desert? 922 00:27:45,204 --> 00:27:45,865 Yeah, I mean, 923 00:27:45,924 --> 00:27:47,566 I think it's difficult to 924 00:27:47,605 --> 00:27:49,707 really arrive at what those 925 00:27:49,767 --> 00:27:51,028 numbers are and difficult 926 00:27:51,048 --> 00:27:52,028 to make an assessment of 927 00:27:52,548 --> 00:27:54,088 how many people have been harmed. 928 00:27:54,108 --> 00:27:55,210 I mean, I think certainly it 929 00:27:55,770 --> 00:27:57,792 And as Todd alluded to earlier, 930 00:27:57,833 --> 00:27:59,273 this sort of virtual wall 931 00:27:59,314 --> 00:28:00,875 that was being presented, 932 00:28:00,954 --> 00:28:02,316 especially during the Bush years, 933 00:28:02,355 --> 00:28:04,337 that was meant to augment 934 00:28:04,397 --> 00:28:05,798 and be a force multiplier 935 00:28:05,838 --> 00:28:07,500 to the boots on the ground 936 00:28:07,540 --> 00:28:08,580 that Border Patrol has 937 00:28:09,342 --> 00:28:10,423 talked about forever, 938 00:28:10,762 --> 00:28:12,944 post Operation Gatekeeper 939 00:28:12,964 --> 00:28:14,987 in the nineties and the 940 00:28:15,027 --> 00:28:15,987 turn strategy the Border 941 00:28:16,027 --> 00:28:16,928 Patrol depends on. 942 00:28:18,368 --> 00:28:19,450 Certainly I can say that 943 00:28:19,589 --> 00:28:22,031 despite so much dependence 944 00:28:22,051 --> 00:28:24,253 now on surveillance technologies, 945 00:28:24,314 --> 00:28:25,295 we continue to see 946 00:28:25,992 --> 00:28:27,534 record numbers of people 947 00:28:27,594 --> 00:28:29,354 that die as a result of 948 00:28:29,413 --> 00:28:31,174 their attempts of crossing into the U.S. 949 00:28:31,214 --> 00:28:33,056 precisely in part because 950 00:28:33,076 --> 00:28:34,056 they are crossing through 951 00:28:34,175 --> 00:28:35,936 much more remote desert 952 00:28:35,957 --> 00:28:37,458 terrain where the ability 953 00:28:37,478 --> 00:28:39,038 to survive is nearly 954 00:28:39,397 --> 00:28:41,098 impossible in some circumstances. 955 00:28:41,739 --> 00:28:42,539 One point I want to make 956 00:28:42,619 --> 00:28:45,300 also is that it's also, you know, 957 00:28:45,320 --> 00:28:46,780 this culture of dependency 958 00:28:46,820 --> 00:28:48,781 on surveillance technologies also becomes 959 00:28:50,035 --> 00:28:51,236 conveniently used. 960 00:28:51,276 --> 00:28:52,817 And so when there is an 961 00:28:52,876 --> 00:28:54,057 instance of someone that 962 00:28:54,117 --> 00:28:56,799 has been accosted by border 963 00:28:56,819 --> 00:28:58,520 patrol agents and there's loss of life, 964 00:28:58,540 --> 00:28:59,382 and I'm thinking of the 965 00:28:59,981 --> 00:29:01,083 case in twenty ten of 966 00:29:01,123 --> 00:29:02,423 Anastasia Hernandez Rojas, 967 00:29:02,463 --> 00:29:03,865 who was beaten by over 968 00:29:04,519 --> 00:29:06,382 twelve agents from Border Patrol, 969 00:29:06,662 --> 00:29:10,006 ICE and OFO that in that case, 970 00:29:10,205 --> 00:29:11,968 in one of the world's most 971 00:29:13,308 --> 00:29:14,451 crossed port of entry, 972 00:29:14,490 --> 00:29:15,672 the San Isidro Port of Entry, 973 00:29:16,051 --> 00:29:17,213 the camera systems 974 00:29:18,134 --> 00:29:19,596 surrounding the border 975 00:29:19,635 --> 00:29:20,616 infrastructure there 976 00:29:21,858 --> 00:29:23,059 seemingly were not working 977 00:29:23,079 --> 00:29:24,040 and were not operating. 978 00:29:24,508 --> 00:29:25,567 or at the very least, 979 00:29:25,627 --> 00:29:27,909 maybe the footage was lost or destroyed. 980 00:29:28,449 --> 00:29:31,009 And so there is this culture 981 00:29:31,069 --> 00:29:32,570 of surveillance that goes 982 00:29:32,590 --> 00:29:33,451 hand in hand with the 983 00:29:33,510 --> 00:29:35,131 culture of impunity that 984 00:29:35,171 --> 00:29:36,471 law enforcement agencies 985 00:29:36,872 --> 00:29:38,732 greatly depend on in order 986 00:29:38,792 --> 00:29:42,134 to pursue whatever their goals are, 987 00:29:42,173 --> 00:29:44,815 which in one case, I would argue, 988 00:29:44,994 --> 00:29:46,914 is the trampling of basic 989 00:29:46,954 --> 00:29:48,096 civil rights and 990 00:29:48,455 --> 00:29:49,635 constitutional protections, 991 00:29:50,256 --> 00:29:51,036 especially around the 992 00:29:51,136 --> 00:29:52,376 US-Mexico borderlands. 993 00:29:53,378 --> 00:29:53,459 Yeah. 994 00:29:53,519 --> 00:29:54,941 I mean, just to follow up with you, 995 00:29:55,060 --> 00:29:55,800 one more question, 996 00:29:55,881 --> 00:29:57,942 which is what is the impact 997 00:29:57,983 --> 00:29:58,903 of all the surveillance 998 00:29:58,943 --> 00:29:59,944 infrastructure on 999 00:30:00,046 --> 00:30:02,248 communities that are that 1000 00:30:02,347 --> 00:30:03,048 are on the border? 1001 00:30:03,107 --> 00:30:05,351 Because one thing we noticed is, you know, 1002 00:30:05,971 --> 00:30:07,112 I think to some extent, 1003 00:30:07,593 --> 00:30:10,055 people who live far away from the border, 1004 00:30:10,234 --> 00:30:11,135 when they think about the border, 1005 00:30:11,155 --> 00:30:11,936 they think about exactly 1006 00:30:11,957 --> 00:30:12,577 this kind of like. 1007 00:30:13,117 --> 00:30:14,358 remote deserts with 1008 00:30:14,659 --> 00:30:15,559 surveillance towers in it. 1009 00:30:15,579 --> 00:30:17,861 But some of these towers are 1010 00:30:17,941 --> 00:30:19,122 in people's backyards. 1011 00:30:19,142 --> 00:30:20,222 They're in public parks. 1012 00:30:20,262 --> 00:30:22,243 They are in towns. 1013 00:30:22,364 --> 00:30:23,964 And I'm wondering if you 1014 00:30:23,984 --> 00:30:24,905 could talk a little bit 1015 00:30:24,925 --> 00:30:26,227 about what you've seen as 1016 00:30:26,287 --> 00:30:27,748 been some of the impact, 1017 00:30:27,827 --> 00:30:29,848 this impunity that you're talking about, 1018 00:30:30,569 --> 00:30:31,470 aided by all the 1019 00:30:31,509 --> 00:30:33,050 surveillance on actual 1020 00:30:33,070 --> 00:30:34,352 communities and towns and 1021 00:30:34,432 --> 00:30:35,252 cities on the border. 1022 00:30:36,277 --> 00:30:36,416 Yeah, 1023 00:30:36,537 --> 00:30:38,997 it brings to mind the tower that's 1024 00:30:39,198 --> 00:30:40,458 sitting in Calexico around 1025 00:30:40,498 --> 00:30:41,778 the public park right along 1026 00:30:41,798 --> 00:30:43,698 the border that Dave has 1027 00:30:43,738 --> 00:30:45,939 done some research on and 1028 00:30:45,999 --> 00:30:47,778 how ever present it is. 1029 00:30:47,979 --> 00:30:49,878 And I think to me, 1030 00:30:49,919 --> 00:30:51,980 what that brings to mind is 1031 00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:53,059 this concept of how 1032 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:54,480 violence gets normalized 1033 00:30:54,500 --> 00:30:56,019 and violence manifested 1034 00:30:56,039 --> 00:30:57,661 through the infrastructure 1035 00:30:57,681 --> 00:30:58,621 of surveillance gets 1036 00:30:58,800 --> 00:30:59,980 normalized and people stop 1037 00:31:00,020 --> 00:31:01,540 questioning why it should 1038 00:31:01,580 --> 00:31:02,622 be there in the first place. 1039 00:31:03,021 --> 00:31:05,162 And I think that's one aspect of 1040 00:31:05,765 --> 00:31:07,586 the militarization of borderlands, 1041 00:31:07,605 --> 00:31:08,826 where you normalize the violence, 1042 00:31:08,865 --> 00:31:09,767 people get used to it, 1043 00:31:09,787 --> 00:31:10,946 they stop questioning it. 1044 00:31:11,666 --> 00:31:12,228 And oftentimes, 1045 00:31:12,288 --> 00:31:13,567 until something happens 1046 00:31:13,587 --> 00:31:14,608 that's really terrible, 1047 00:31:15,048 --> 00:31:16,769 that then people respond to it. 1048 00:31:17,869 --> 00:31:19,530 And that's part of the 1049 00:31:19,611 --> 00:31:22,152 culture of both impunity, 1050 00:31:22,551 --> 00:31:25,053 but also the culture of militarization, 1051 00:31:25,532 --> 00:31:27,253 that unfortunately, 1052 00:31:27,534 --> 00:31:30,035 there is a part of society 1053 00:31:30,075 --> 00:31:31,816 that gets accustomed to it 1054 00:31:31,855 --> 00:31:32,895 and they stop questioning 1055 00:31:33,336 --> 00:31:34,096 why it should be there in 1056 00:31:34,116 --> 00:31:34,717 the first place. 1057 00:31:36,989 --> 00:31:38,490 Todd, I have a question for you. 1058 00:31:39,111 --> 00:31:40,153 Feel free to jump in on any 1059 00:31:40,192 --> 00:31:41,253 of these other questions as well. 1060 00:31:41,273 --> 00:31:42,955 But my question to you is, 1061 00:31:42,976 --> 00:31:44,337 I'm wondering to what 1062 00:31:44,417 --> 00:31:46,861 extent border security 1063 00:31:46,922 --> 00:31:49,505 policy and the desire, 1064 00:31:49,545 --> 00:31:50,665 the need for all of this 1065 00:31:50,685 --> 00:31:53,109 surveillance is being driven by vendors? 1066 00:31:53,910 --> 00:31:54,691 Because that is something 1067 00:31:54,730 --> 00:31:56,251 we're very much seeing in 1068 00:31:56,531 --> 00:31:57,712 local law enforcement, 1069 00:31:58,532 --> 00:32:00,494 that they're inventing a 1070 00:32:00,555 --> 00:32:01,955 need for a lot of this tech 1071 00:32:02,355 --> 00:32:03,757 and they are then making a 1072 00:32:03,797 --> 00:32:04,596 lot of money off of it. 1073 00:32:05,137 --> 00:32:07,578 But we know that it's a massive industry. 1074 00:32:07,659 --> 00:32:08,839 Individual companies are 1075 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:10,681 getting contracts that are 1076 00:32:10,701 --> 00:32:12,041 sometimes in excess of a 1077 00:32:12,122 --> 00:32:13,884 billion dollars for their 1078 00:32:13,903 --> 00:32:14,544 surveillance equipment. 1079 00:32:14,564 --> 00:32:15,464 So I'm wondering how much 1080 00:32:15,805 --> 00:32:18,105 you see vendors really kind 1081 00:32:18,125 --> 00:32:20,488 of driving this need, 1082 00:32:20,528 --> 00:32:21,969 this market for more 1083 00:32:22,028 --> 00:32:23,470 surveillance on the border. 1084 00:32:25,871 --> 00:32:27,810 yeah I mean I remember when 1085 00:32:27,892 --> 00:32:30,211 I first started looking 1086 00:32:30,291 --> 00:32:31,553 into this and going to some 1087 00:32:31,593 --> 00:32:33,673 of the border exhibitions 1088 00:32:33,713 --> 00:32:34,733 like the border security 1089 00:32:34,814 --> 00:32:36,314 expo that dave mentioned 1090 00:32:37,115 --> 00:32:38,654 and uh I went to one in I 1091 00:32:38,694 --> 00:32:42,056 believe it was and a vendor 1092 00:32:42,316 --> 00:32:45,998 I remember talking to vendors there 1093 00:32:47,011 --> 00:32:49,453 And several of them, multiple ones, 1094 00:32:49,713 --> 00:32:50,775 I have quotes from them 1095 00:32:50,835 --> 00:32:53,217 saying that they were 1096 00:32:54,157 --> 00:32:56,119 vendors selling to the US military. 1097 00:32:57,580 --> 00:32:58,721 And one of them said, 1098 00:32:58,961 --> 00:33:00,663 and basically this was the sentiment, 1099 00:33:01,944 --> 00:33:03,365 war operations are starting 1100 00:33:03,405 --> 00:33:05,428 to wind down in certain 1101 00:33:05,468 --> 00:33:07,368 places like Afghanistan and Iraq. 1102 00:33:08,130 --> 00:33:10,432 And now we are looking for a new market. 1103 00:33:11,363 --> 00:33:13,585 And thus, hence, 1104 00:33:14,046 --> 00:33:15,106 this was one of the new 1105 00:33:15,146 --> 00:33:18,910 markets in border security. 1106 00:33:20,412 --> 00:33:22,394 And that sort of putting 1107 00:33:22,433 --> 00:33:23,595 themselves in the market 1108 00:33:23,734 --> 00:33:25,497 and that sort of marketplace 1109 00:33:26,317 --> 00:33:27,818 and having you know you have 1110 00:33:27,979 --> 00:33:30,039 companies of all statures 1111 00:33:30,059 --> 00:33:31,340 right you have large ones 1112 00:33:31,361 --> 00:33:33,821 small ones um and the large 1113 00:33:33,922 --> 00:33:35,942 ones of course also have 1114 00:33:36,403 --> 00:33:37,703 the ability to get behind 1115 00:33:37,743 --> 00:33:39,404 closed doors in washington 1116 00:33:40,105 --> 00:33:41,807 to talk to key policy 1117 00:33:41,846 --> 00:33:45,308 makers to get in to get in 1118 00:33:45,348 --> 00:33:46,229 there when they're talking 1119 00:33:46,269 --> 00:33:47,589 about appropriations or 1120 00:33:47,630 --> 00:33:50,611 budgets to make sure there 1121 00:33:50,811 --> 00:33:53,212 are companies involved you know in 1122 00:33:54,196 --> 00:33:56,398 considered as, but new budgets come out. 1123 00:33:57,240 --> 00:33:57,400 Um, 1124 00:33:57,840 --> 00:33:59,801 when I remember like the comprehensive 1125 00:33:59,842 --> 00:34:01,022 immigration reform bill 1126 00:34:01,063 --> 00:34:02,805 that came out into, I think it was, 1127 00:34:02,825 --> 00:34:04,226 correct me if I'm wrong. 1128 00:34:04,587 --> 00:34:05,907 There's the quote unquote 1129 00:34:05,928 --> 00:34:07,888 gang of eight one and it 1130 00:34:07,949 --> 00:34:08,909 passed through the Senate. 1131 00:34:09,309 --> 00:34:10,269 But if you look at the I 1132 00:34:10,289 --> 00:34:10,989 think it was almost a 1133 00:34:11,050 --> 00:34:12,311 thousand pages and there 1134 00:34:12,331 --> 00:34:15,311 was in several of those pages, 1135 00:34:15,411 --> 00:34:16,652 there was itemized list of 1136 00:34:16,692 --> 00:34:18,112 what companies were going 1137 00:34:18,132 --> 00:34:19,572 to get what contracts. 1138 00:34:20,032 --> 00:34:22,373 If this if this this what 1139 00:34:22,393 --> 00:34:23,353 was called a comprehensive 1140 00:34:23,373 --> 00:34:25,215 immigration reform bill, 1141 00:34:25,255 --> 00:34:26,414 which included forty five 1142 00:34:26,454 --> 00:34:27,735 billion dollars for border 1143 00:34:27,775 --> 00:34:28,956 and immigration enforcement. 1144 00:34:29,577 --> 00:34:31,197 if what companies were going 1145 00:34:31,217 --> 00:34:32,637 to get like Sikorsky was going to get, 1146 00:34:33,978 --> 00:34:34,478 I think it was something 1147 00:34:34,518 --> 00:34:36,639 like sixteen Blackhawk helicopters. 1148 00:34:36,659 --> 00:34:37,878 And, you know, 1149 00:34:37,898 --> 00:34:38,840 there's a bunch of different 1150 00:34:38,880 --> 00:34:40,679 other companies that were there. 1151 00:34:40,719 --> 00:34:43,101 So I would say that that in the industry, 1152 00:34:43,141 --> 00:34:45,081 the way the way that it can 1153 00:34:45,181 --> 00:34:46,942 insert itself and then the 1154 00:34:46,961 --> 00:34:48,081 way that it can influence 1155 00:34:48,121 --> 00:34:50,003 policy and the way that it 1156 00:34:50,123 --> 00:34:52,222 also is able to give money 1157 00:34:52,342 --> 00:34:55,903 to campaigns makes its 1158 00:34:55,963 --> 00:34:58,804 influence pretty powerful. 1159 00:35:00,572 --> 00:35:02,614 yeah absolutely yeah and and 1160 00:35:02,753 --> 00:35:04,114 at the border security expo 1161 00:35:04,175 --> 00:35:05,757 it's a very good place to 1162 00:35:05,896 --> 00:35:07,338 see the influence of some 1163 00:35:07,378 --> 00:35:08,599 of those vendors in real 1164 00:35:08,639 --> 00:35:10,860 time um petra you mentioned 1165 00:35:11,141 --> 00:35:12,722 robo dogs earlier and I 1166 00:35:12,782 --> 00:35:15,684 know that the dhs had a 1167 00:35:15,724 --> 00:35:17,146 kind of trial run of them 1168 00:35:17,226 --> 00:35:18,708 earlier on we have a panel 1169 00:35:18,728 --> 00:35:19,668 in the exhibit about the 1170 00:35:19,989 --> 00:35:21,389 the potential future of 1171 00:35:21,469 --> 00:35:22,451 border surveillance. 1172 00:35:22,811 --> 00:35:24,492 And I'm wondering if, you know, 1173 00:35:24,632 --> 00:35:27,014 are robots going to play a larger role? 1174 00:35:27,875 --> 00:35:29,657 What tech do you see emerging? 1175 00:35:30,016 --> 00:35:31,297 What is going to be the next 1176 00:35:31,338 --> 00:35:33,079 generation of border surveillance? 1177 00:35:33,559 --> 00:35:34,900 Is the U.S.-Mexico border 1178 00:35:34,960 --> 00:35:36,422 the most high tech, 1179 00:35:36,442 --> 00:35:37,963 the most futuristic of 1180 00:35:38,023 --> 00:35:39,423 these borders that you've looked at? 1181 00:35:39,443 --> 00:35:41,545 And what is that next 1182 00:35:41,565 --> 00:35:43,027 generation of tech going to look like? 1183 00:35:43,086 --> 00:35:44,068 And this is coming from somebody who, 1184 00:35:44,507 --> 00:35:45,208 as a pet project, 1185 00:35:45,228 --> 00:35:45,889 is very interested in 1186 00:35:45,969 --> 00:35:47,170 autonomous weapon systems. 1187 00:35:47,230 --> 00:35:48,070 So I'll add... 1188 00:35:49,150 --> 00:35:50,152 What is also the chance that 1189 00:35:50,172 --> 00:35:52,552 we see some of these robot 1190 00:35:52,592 --> 00:35:55,255 dogs or even drones that 1191 00:35:55,275 --> 00:35:56,175 are going to be armed in 1192 00:35:56,195 --> 00:35:57,996 the next few years? 1193 00:35:58,775 --> 00:35:59,117 Yeah, 1194 00:35:59,137 --> 00:36:01,277 so I think the robot dog example is 1195 00:36:01,338 --> 00:36:02,657 probably one of the most 1196 00:36:02,777 --> 00:36:04,498 visceral examples of tech. 1197 00:36:04,579 --> 00:36:06,420 It makes you feel all sorts 1198 00:36:06,440 --> 00:36:07,920 of ways because for the 1199 00:36:08,300 --> 00:36:09,481 sci-fi fans in the room, 1200 00:36:09,501 --> 00:36:10,822 you might recall that it 1201 00:36:10,862 --> 00:36:12,623 was featured on a TV show 1202 00:36:12,643 --> 00:36:13,384 like Black Mirror, 1203 00:36:13,423 --> 00:36:14,965 but it's very much a reality. 1204 00:36:15,985 --> 00:36:16,525 So the Department of 1205 00:36:16,545 --> 00:36:17,706 Homeland Security announced 1206 00:36:17,766 --> 00:36:18,927 in twenty twenty two, 1207 00:36:19,047 --> 00:36:20,088 but it was actually based 1208 00:36:20,208 --> 00:36:21,608 on a few projects that were 1209 00:36:21,668 --> 00:36:22,750 piloted in the European 1210 00:36:22,869 --> 00:36:24,351 Union a few years before 1211 00:36:24,710 --> 00:36:25,532 with some really terrible 1212 00:36:25,572 --> 00:36:27,572 names like Snoopy and Sniffer. 1213 00:36:27,813 --> 00:36:28,052 I mean, 1214 00:36:28,072 --> 00:36:29,753 the name and nomenclature behind 1215 00:36:29,773 --> 00:36:30,715 these projects, 1216 00:36:30,835 --> 00:36:32,135 that's a whole other thing 1217 00:36:32,155 --> 00:36:33,157 that we need to look into. 1218 00:36:34,416 --> 00:36:34,938 But yeah, I mean, 1219 00:36:34,978 --> 00:36:35,918 the RoboDogs are a 1220 00:36:35,958 --> 00:36:37,159 military-grade piece of 1221 00:36:37,199 --> 00:36:39,059 technology that can be armed. 1222 00:36:39,980 --> 00:36:40,960 And even though it's not 1223 00:36:41,059 --> 00:36:42,420 exactly clear where that 1224 00:36:42,440 --> 00:36:43,621 pilot project went at the 1225 00:36:43,661 --> 00:36:44,621 US-Mexico border, 1226 00:36:45,262 --> 00:36:47,782 I think it signals an appetite, again, 1227 00:36:47,822 --> 00:36:49,603 for this militarization of 1228 00:36:49,824 --> 00:36:51,204 interventions that are 1229 00:36:51,605 --> 00:36:54,086 brought out for the purposes 1230 00:36:54,126 --> 00:36:55,288 of migration management or 1231 00:36:55,349 --> 00:36:56,248 border enforcement. 1232 00:36:57,170 --> 00:36:59,271 In terms of where this might be going, 1233 00:36:59,472 --> 00:36:59,853 I mean, 1234 00:37:00,193 --> 00:37:02,215 definitely the obsession or what 1235 00:37:02,235 --> 00:37:04,036 some people call the AI 1236 00:37:04,195 --> 00:37:06,077 arms race is in full swing. 1237 00:37:07,559 --> 00:37:10,141 debatable where AI is going 1238 00:37:10,181 --> 00:37:12,262 to play a role perhaps in 1239 00:37:12,342 --> 00:37:13,784 border enforcement per se, 1240 00:37:13,824 --> 00:37:14,844 because sometimes the 1241 00:37:14,864 --> 00:37:16,905 technology doesn't work as intended. 1242 00:37:16,925 --> 00:37:18,606 It's also important to, I think, 1243 00:37:18,626 --> 00:37:19,367 critique it from that 1244 00:37:19,407 --> 00:37:21,648 perspective that oftentimes 1245 00:37:22,110 --> 00:37:23,190 the announcements are scary 1246 00:37:23,210 --> 00:37:24,351 and the technology is scary, 1247 00:37:24,371 --> 00:37:25,331 but it is also a 1248 00:37:25,391 --> 00:37:27,012 performance of surveillance 1249 00:37:27,092 --> 00:37:28,793 that plays into the hands 1250 00:37:28,853 --> 00:37:30,434 of these powerful actors that are 1251 00:37:30,914 --> 00:37:32,735 able to kind of manifest the 1252 00:37:32,757 --> 00:37:33,757 fears that a lot of people 1253 00:37:33,797 --> 00:37:34,858 have around the so-called 1254 00:37:34,978 --> 00:37:36,018 problem of migration. 1255 00:37:36,518 --> 00:37:37,260 But that's not to say that 1256 00:37:37,300 --> 00:37:37,900 we shouldn't be paying 1257 00:37:37,940 --> 00:37:39,041 attention to the kind of 1258 00:37:39,081 --> 00:37:39,860 developments that are 1259 00:37:39,880 --> 00:37:42,103 happening with generative AI, for example, 1260 00:37:42,503 --> 00:37:43,724 and more and more automation. 1261 00:37:44,204 --> 00:37:45,125 But I just want to bring it 1262 00:37:45,144 --> 00:37:46,885 back to a point that I made earlier. 1263 00:37:47,206 --> 00:37:48,967 A lot of violence happens 1264 00:37:49,708 --> 00:37:51,688 in places that are maybe 1265 00:37:51,768 --> 00:37:53,668 less sexy or visceral. 1266 00:37:54,028 --> 00:37:55,670 So it's not just about the robodogs, 1267 00:37:55,710 --> 00:37:56,110 but again, 1268 00:37:56,150 --> 00:37:58,250 it's about discriminatory data sets. 1269 00:37:58,670 --> 00:38:00,331 It's about algorithms that 1270 00:38:00,670 --> 00:38:01,690 make decisions about 1271 00:38:01,751 --> 00:38:02,510 whether or not you can 1272 00:38:02,590 --> 00:38:04,092 enter a country or reunite 1273 00:38:04,112 --> 00:38:05,172 with your spouse or whether 1274 00:38:05,192 --> 00:38:06,612 you're going to be put into detention. 1275 00:38:06,992 --> 00:38:07,793 It's these things that are 1276 00:38:08,092 --> 00:38:09,253 even more difficult to 1277 00:38:09,293 --> 00:38:10,672 query and critique because 1278 00:38:10,713 --> 00:38:12,713 we can't point our finger and say, well, 1279 00:38:12,753 --> 00:38:13,594 this is what's happening. 1280 00:38:13,634 --> 00:38:14,934 You can't take a picture of 1281 00:38:14,954 --> 00:38:16,835 a discriminatory or racist algorithm. 1282 00:38:17,414 --> 00:38:19,436 And those are the tools of 1283 00:38:19,476 --> 00:38:20,398 oppression and violence 1284 00:38:20,418 --> 00:38:23,221 that we also have to pay attention to. 1285 00:38:23,340 --> 00:38:25,003 And also often supplied by 1286 00:38:25,063 --> 00:38:25,923 vendors as well. 1287 00:38:26,063 --> 00:38:27,405 There's also an industry 1288 00:38:27,746 --> 00:38:29,126 that is popping up around 1289 00:38:29,226 --> 00:38:30,128 automated decision making. 1290 00:38:30,708 --> 00:38:31,909 They're making decisions 1291 00:38:31,969 --> 00:38:33,211 about people's life and 1292 00:38:33,231 --> 00:38:35,114 their freedom behind these 1293 00:38:35,134 --> 00:38:36,175 kind of black box of 1294 00:38:36,235 --> 00:38:37,516 proprietary information. 1295 00:38:37,556 --> 00:38:38,858 It's a terrific point. 1296 00:38:40,239 --> 00:38:40,978 We probably have time for 1297 00:38:41,039 --> 00:38:41,639 one more question before 1298 00:38:41,659 --> 00:38:42,661 we're going to open up to 1299 00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:43,802 audience questions. 1300 00:38:44,842 --> 00:38:46,704 This is for Pedro first, and then Todd. 1301 00:38:47,625 --> 00:38:48,846 As activists and as 1302 00:38:49,445 --> 00:38:50,907 journalists who often do a 1303 00:38:50,967 --> 00:38:52,248 lot of work on the border, 1304 00:38:52,708 --> 00:38:53,688 across the border, 1305 00:38:54,269 --> 00:38:55,610 I'm wondering if you 1306 00:38:55,650 --> 00:38:58,833 yourself have thought about, you know, 1307 00:38:59,534 --> 00:39:00,534 precautions you take with 1308 00:39:00,554 --> 00:39:01,715 your own cybersecurity 1309 00:39:03,175 --> 00:39:04,436 issues that you have you 1310 00:39:04,456 --> 00:39:05,856 have experienced or your 1311 00:39:05,896 --> 00:39:06,956 colleagues have experienced 1312 00:39:07,336 --> 00:39:09,898 in doing this work in a 1313 00:39:09,958 --> 00:39:11,157 setting where there is, as you said, 1314 00:39:11,237 --> 00:39:12,619 a tremendous amount of impunity, 1315 00:39:12,878 --> 00:39:13,918 where there's a tremendous 1316 00:39:13,958 --> 00:39:14,880 amount of surveillance, 1317 00:39:15,179 --> 00:39:16,380 where the government has 1318 00:39:16,460 --> 00:39:18,260 theories that rights erode 1319 00:39:18,320 --> 00:39:19,641 as you get closer to the border. 1320 00:39:19,981 --> 00:39:20,762 So I'm wondering if you all 1321 00:39:20,802 --> 00:39:22,202 could talk about the kind 1322 00:39:22,222 --> 00:39:24,322 of experiences you've had 1323 00:39:24,523 --> 00:39:26,003 as journalists and as activists. 1324 00:39:27,443 --> 00:39:27,965 Yeah, certainly. 1325 00:39:28,585 --> 00:39:29,889 And I would point to a 1326 00:39:29,929 --> 00:39:31,052 situation in twenty 1327 00:39:31,072 --> 00:39:32,056 eighteen a few years ago 1328 00:39:32,115 --> 00:39:33,159 when there were large 1329 00:39:35,099 --> 00:39:36,360 People on the move in 1330 00:39:36,380 --> 00:39:37,422 caravans arriving to the 1331 00:39:37,501 --> 00:39:39,664 U.S.-Mexico border and the 1332 00:39:39,684 --> 00:39:41,306 Customs and Border Protection, CBP, 1333 00:39:41,365 --> 00:39:43,186 together with their Mexican counterparts, 1334 00:39:43,748 --> 00:39:46,811 had secret groups in Tijuana, Mexico, 1335 00:39:47,291 --> 00:39:48,351 that were surveilling 1336 00:39:48,512 --> 00:39:49,512 certain individuals that 1337 00:39:49,552 --> 00:39:51,875 they associated as being 1338 00:39:52,155 --> 00:39:52,996 involved in one way or 1339 00:39:53,036 --> 00:39:54,617 another with the 1340 00:39:54,697 --> 00:39:56,219 organization of the 1341 00:39:56,259 --> 00:39:58,501 migrants that were moving north. 1342 00:39:59,010 --> 00:40:00,192 And this included journalists, 1343 00:40:00,231 --> 00:40:01,291 it included activists, 1344 00:40:01,391 --> 00:40:03,833 it included humanitarian aid workers. 1345 00:40:04,494 --> 00:40:06,155 And as they were crossing 1346 00:40:06,235 --> 00:40:07,315 and returning into the 1347 00:40:07,355 --> 00:40:09,315 United States through the 1348 00:40:09,356 --> 00:40:10,336 San Ysidro Port of Entry, 1349 00:40:10,916 --> 00:40:13,659 they were put aside and put into a list. 1350 00:40:13,739 --> 00:40:15,239 And this list was then made 1351 00:40:15,280 --> 00:40:17,820 public and became acutely 1352 00:40:17,860 --> 00:40:19,121 aware that there was a 1353 00:40:19,161 --> 00:40:20,181 specific targeting of 1354 00:40:20,242 --> 00:40:21,123 certain individuals. 1355 00:40:21,983 --> 00:40:23,403 And at that point then, 1356 00:40:24,143 --> 00:40:27,346 one becomes much more aware 1357 00:40:27,949 --> 00:40:29,289 a prize of the fact that 1358 00:40:29,449 --> 00:40:31,371 there is real significant 1359 00:40:31,411 --> 00:40:33,291 surveillance taking place 1360 00:40:33,572 --> 00:40:35,871 of certain organizations or 1361 00:40:35,911 --> 00:40:37,952 certain groups of people or 1362 00:40:37,992 --> 00:40:39,052 population groups that are 1363 00:40:39,092 --> 00:40:40,574 involved in humanitarian 1364 00:40:40,614 --> 00:40:42,795 aid support towards some of 1365 00:40:42,815 --> 00:40:44,635 the most vulnerable people on the planet. 1366 00:40:45,235 --> 00:40:46,456 And it does raise questions 1367 00:40:46,496 --> 00:40:48,436 about what steps we need to 1368 00:40:48,476 --> 00:40:50,516 take to ensure that the 1369 00:40:50,536 --> 00:40:51,896 information that we're 1370 00:40:51,936 --> 00:40:53,677 collecting is safeguarded, 1371 00:40:53,717 --> 00:40:55,257 that our own personal 1372 00:40:55,318 --> 00:40:56,978 information is safeguarded, 1373 00:40:57,588 --> 00:40:59,028 particularly in a world 1374 00:40:59,088 --> 00:41:01,230 where there are many more 1375 00:41:01,911 --> 00:41:03,952 people that are taking to 1376 00:41:04,552 --> 00:41:06,273 on a sort of right wing approach, 1377 00:41:06,813 --> 00:41:09,335 going up to our faces, taking video of us, 1378 00:41:09,516 --> 00:41:10,096 calling us, 1379 00:41:12,556 --> 00:41:14,456 human smugglers as we're 1380 00:41:15,137 --> 00:41:16,797 working at a solidarity aid 1381 00:41:16,838 --> 00:41:17,998 station right along the border. 1382 00:41:18,577 --> 00:41:20,759 And so there is a much more 1383 00:41:20,818 --> 00:41:22,878 palpable danger that people 1384 00:41:22,918 --> 00:41:25,940 in this field have to deal with. 1385 00:41:26,000 --> 00:41:27,039 And so the measures that we 1386 00:41:27,079 --> 00:41:28,960 have to take for security 1387 00:41:29,059 --> 00:41:35,081 have to be top notch. 1388 00:41:35,141 --> 00:41:36,382 Yeah, I definitely agree. 1389 00:41:36,681 --> 00:41:40,842 There's always in consideration 1390 00:41:42,838 --> 00:41:45,240 as a journalist that covers these things, 1391 00:41:45,280 --> 00:41:47,101 but just thinking about the 1392 00:41:47,141 --> 00:41:48,163 incident that Pedro was 1393 00:41:48,182 --> 00:41:49,023 talking about or the 1394 00:41:49,103 --> 00:41:52,465 incidents involving other 1395 00:41:52,505 --> 00:41:53,867 journalists and activists. 1396 00:41:54,086 --> 00:41:58,030 And just thinking about how, 1397 00:41:59,070 --> 00:41:59,972 I know at one point the 1398 00:42:00,052 --> 00:42:01,753 ACLU would call the hundred 1399 00:42:01,793 --> 00:42:02,833 mile jurisdiction 1400 00:42:03,503 --> 00:42:05,244 around the around the border 1401 00:42:05,264 --> 00:42:06,864 and that u.s mexico border 1402 00:42:06,925 --> 00:42:07,865 but that could include the 1403 00:42:07,905 --> 00:42:10,527 coasts and you know the uh 1404 00:42:10,547 --> 00:42:11,907 the uh northern border as 1405 00:42:11,927 --> 00:42:12,907 well the hundred that 1406 00:42:12,947 --> 00:42:14,588 hundred mile jurisdiction 1407 00:42:14,628 --> 00:42:16,248 that includes two-thirds of 1408 00:42:16,268 --> 00:42:17,568 the u.s population like 1409 00:42:17,668 --> 00:42:18,469 over two hundred million 1410 00:42:18,489 --> 00:42:20,210 people as a constitution 1411 00:42:20,250 --> 00:42:21,811 free zone I did write that 1412 00:42:21,871 --> 00:42:23,050 in an article once and I 1413 00:42:23,070 --> 00:42:24,992 was an aclu person said 1414 00:42:25,032 --> 00:42:26,652 please don't attribute that to us 1415 00:42:27,333 --> 00:42:28,833 Because, you know, 1416 00:42:30,253 --> 00:42:30,994 so maybe we should call it 1417 00:42:31,014 --> 00:42:33,333 the Constitution mangled zone, right? 1418 00:42:33,653 --> 00:42:35,173 But the fact of the matter is, 1419 00:42:35,213 --> 00:42:37,215 if you go through, like, it comes, 1420 00:42:37,414 --> 00:42:39,534 I was just in Mexico for a 1421 00:42:39,574 --> 00:42:40,635 week doing research. 1422 00:42:40,675 --> 00:42:42,396 I'm just getting back right now, actually. 1423 00:42:42,976 --> 00:42:44,775 And I had to, like, 1424 00:42:44,896 --> 00:42:46,936 consider crossing the border, 1425 00:42:47,117 --> 00:42:48,556 understand that the actual 1426 00:42:48,597 --> 00:42:50,976 border crossing, that all rights, 1427 00:42:51,117 --> 00:42:52,918 your rights are gone in 1428 00:42:52,958 --> 00:42:55,237 that moment of crossing the border, that 1429 00:42:55,824 --> 00:42:57,204 they're they have been 1430 00:42:57,646 --> 00:42:59,226 confiscating I mean they 1431 00:42:59,246 --> 00:43:00,085 could take you into 1432 00:43:00,126 --> 00:43:01,967 secondary interrogation 1433 00:43:02,027 --> 00:43:04,106 that's happened to me among 1434 00:43:04,246 --> 00:43:05,748 among other people and and 1435 00:43:06,088 --> 00:43:07,148 I was surprised the last 1436 00:43:07,188 --> 00:43:08,528 time I went into it that 1437 00:43:08,548 --> 00:43:09,248 they shut the door and 1438 00:43:09,289 --> 00:43:10,429 locked it right so you 1439 00:43:10,449 --> 00:43:11,929 couldn't even get out so I 1440 00:43:11,969 --> 00:43:13,150 guess you're detained right 1441 00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:15,731 and um and and they can 1442 00:43:15,791 --> 00:43:17,311 confiscate your devices 1443 00:43:17,630 --> 00:43:18,831 that that happens it 1444 00:43:18,871 --> 00:43:20,172 happens quite on the 1445 00:43:20,211 --> 00:43:21,751 regular uh this time I 1446 00:43:21,771 --> 00:43:22,913 didn't even take my laptop 1447 00:43:22,932 --> 00:43:23,932 with me I just took my 1448 00:43:24,519 --> 00:43:25,521 I just took my phone. 1449 00:43:25,561 --> 00:43:28,501 I mean, it was fine coming back and forth, 1450 00:43:28,561 --> 00:43:30,764 but the considerations and 1451 00:43:30,784 --> 00:43:32,545 the sort of things that you 1452 00:43:32,585 --> 00:43:34,166 have to think of as you 1453 00:43:34,206 --> 00:43:36,347 move through this territory 1454 00:43:36,407 --> 00:43:40,168 and the sort of extra 1455 00:43:40,650 --> 00:43:41,849 constitutional power, 1456 00:43:41,909 --> 00:43:42,751 I guess you could call it, 1457 00:43:43,751 --> 00:43:45,932 that the forces, 1458 00:43:45,992 --> 00:43:46,913 the immigration or the 1459 00:43:47,032 --> 00:43:49,695 border forces can wage are 1460 00:43:49,715 --> 00:43:51,516 definitely constantly in consideration. 1461 00:43:53,047 --> 00:43:54,827 And this is where I'll plug 1462 00:43:55,009 --> 00:43:56,208 our surveillance 1463 00:43:56,228 --> 00:43:59,010 self-defense guides at EFF, 1464 00:43:59,130 --> 00:44:01,932 which include guides for 1465 00:44:01,952 --> 00:44:02,833 journalists crossing 1466 00:44:02,873 --> 00:44:04,074 borders and who want to 1467 00:44:04,235 --> 00:44:05,335 make sure they safeguard 1468 00:44:05,356 --> 00:44:06,295 the data they've been 1469 00:44:06,335 --> 00:44:08,036 collecting in their drafts. 1470 00:44:08,518 --> 00:44:09,778 So, yeah, thank you so much. 1471 00:44:10,418 --> 00:44:11,099 So now we're going to turn 1472 00:44:11,119 --> 00:44:12,722 to some answers from some 1473 00:44:12,782 --> 00:44:14,083 questions from the audience. 1474 00:44:14,523 --> 00:44:15,224 The first one, 1475 00:44:16,126 --> 00:44:17,967 I'll start us out scary and 1476 00:44:17,987 --> 00:44:19,349 then we'll hopefully get a 1477 00:44:19,389 --> 00:44:20,471 little more optimistic, 1478 00:44:20,530 --> 00:44:22,293 which is for each of you, 1479 00:44:22,673 --> 00:44:23,815 what is one piece of 1480 00:44:23,855 --> 00:44:25,657 technology actively in the 1481 00:44:25,677 --> 00:44:26,757 field now or that you see 1482 00:44:26,797 --> 00:44:28,219 emerging that you are most 1483 00:44:28,300 --> 00:44:28,880 concerned about? 1484 00:44:28,940 --> 00:44:29,742 What's the one piece of 1485 00:44:29,762 --> 00:44:30,402 technology that kind of 1486 00:44:30,762 --> 00:44:32,244 keeps you up the most, 1487 00:44:33,266 --> 00:44:35,449 whether it is as exciting 1488 00:44:35,570 --> 00:44:36,731 and photographable as a 1489 00:44:37,373 --> 00:44:39,215 robot dog or as kind of 1490 00:44:39,295 --> 00:44:41,679 insidious and hidden as algorithms. 1491 00:44:41,699 --> 00:44:43,101 We'll start with Petra. 1492 00:44:45,559 --> 00:44:47,382 So I'll go with another dystopic one, 1493 00:44:48,242 --> 00:44:50,304 and that would be an AI lie detector. 1494 00:44:51,065 --> 00:44:52,387 This was a pilot project 1495 00:44:52,487 --> 00:44:53,989 that was pushed forward in 1496 00:44:54,028 --> 00:44:55,309 the European Union called 1497 00:44:55,590 --> 00:44:58,293 Eye Border Control, Small Eye Border, 1498 00:44:58,434 --> 00:44:59,173 CTRL. 1499 00:44:59,355 --> 00:45:00,376 See that point about names? 1500 00:45:00,735 --> 00:45:01,856 Seriously, the naming, you know, 1501 00:45:01,876 --> 00:45:03,438 now we have an iPhone, an iPad, 1502 00:45:03,478 --> 00:45:04,559 and an Eye Border Control. 1503 00:45:05,221 --> 00:45:05,800 Essentially, 1504 00:45:05,860 --> 00:45:07,983 this was a project that tried to create a 1505 00:45:08,523 --> 00:45:09,425 for lack of a better word, 1506 00:45:09,445 --> 00:45:10,706 an AI lie detector that 1507 00:45:10,726 --> 00:45:11,465 would use facial 1508 00:45:11,485 --> 00:45:12,726 recognition or micro 1509 00:45:12,786 --> 00:45:14,648 expression analysis to make 1510 00:45:14,688 --> 00:45:16,010 determinations about 1511 00:45:16,050 --> 00:45:17,110 whether or not a person was 1512 00:45:17,150 --> 00:45:18,032 telling the truth at the 1513 00:45:18,072 --> 00:45:19,052 border and then being 1514 00:45:19,112 --> 00:45:20,052 screened for secondary 1515 00:45:20,092 --> 00:45:21,353 processing as a result. 1516 00:45:22,155 --> 00:45:23,396 So much to say about this. 1517 00:45:23,615 --> 00:45:24,135 First of all, 1518 00:45:24,217 --> 00:45:26,338 it's funded through a massive 1519 00:45:26,378 --> 00:45:27,659 research consortium called 1520 00:45:27,719 --> 00:45:29,460 Horizon Twenty Twenty with 1521 00:45:29,501 --> 00:45:31,882 an academic institution involved as well. 1522 00:45:31,983 --> 00:45:32,463 So, you know, 1523 00:45:32,483 --> 00:45:34,063 as someone who has one foot in academia, 1524 00:45:34,083 --> 00:45:35,925 I think it's important to also critique 1525 00:45:36,505 --> 00:45:37,768 what academics do to 1526 00:45:37,827 --> 00:45:39,208 legitimize extremely 1527 00:45:39,268 --> 00:45:40,550 problematic projects. 1528 00:45:40,710 --> 00:45:41,431 That's one point. 1529 00:45:42,032 --> 00:45:42,914 But if I want to analyze it 1530 00:45:43,074 --> 00:45:45,356 from a refugee law perspective, I mean, 1531 00:45:45,677 --> 00:45:47,438 how can an AI lie detector 1532 00:45:47,679 --> 00:45:48,780 deal with differences in 1533 00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:50,382 cross-cultural communication, 1534 00:45:50,461 --> 00:45:51,083 for example? 1535 00:45:51,956 --> 00:45:53,117 I've represented people when 1536 00:45:53,177 --> 00:45:54,599 I used to practice law who 1537 00:45:54,639 --> 00:45:55,719 didn't make eye contact 1538 00:45:55,780 --> 00:45:56,820 with a judge of the 1539 00:45:56,880 --> 00:45:59,063 opposite gender because of religion, 1540 00:45:59,563 --> 00:46:01,704 their experiences, nerves. 1541 00:46:02,505 --> 00:46:03,465 Or what about the impact of 1542 00:46:03,507 --> 00:46:04,748 trauma on memory and the 1543 00:46:04,788 --> 00:46:05,568 fact that we don't tell 1544 00:46:05,628 --> 00:46:07,230 stories in a linear way anyway? 1545 00:46:07,650 --> 00:46:08,871 Like human decision makers 1546 00:46:08,911 --> 00:46:09,711 struggle with this. 1547 00:46:09,891 --> 00:46:11,952 How can an AI lie detector be any better? 1548 00:46:12,753 --> 00:46:14,175 This definitely keeps me up at night. 1549 00:46:14,235 --> 00:46:15,576 Pedro? 1550 00:46:18,467 --> 00:46:19,108 There's so much. 1551 00:46:19,527 --> 00:46:21,731 There's so much that we can 1552 00:46:21,871 --> 00:46:22,492 answer that question. 1553 00:46:22,692 --> 00:46:24,193 I would say I referred to it earlier, 1554 00:46:24,253 --> 00:46:26,054 the collection of DNA, 1555 00:46:26,436 --> 00:46:28,257 and oftentimes the DNA is 1556 00:46:28,277 --> 00:46:30,119 being collected without the 1557 00:46:30,139 --> 00:46:31,280 individual's consent. 1558 00:46:31,782 --> 00:46:33,784 They have no idea that this 1559 00:46:33,824 --> 00:46:36,447 is that's being done for this purpose. 1560 00:46:36,467 --> 00:46:38,769 When when they when border 1561 00:46:38,789 --> 00:46:40,030 patrol agents will swab 1562 00:46:41,007 --> 00:46:41,789 inside of their mouths to 1563 00:46:41,829 --> 00:46:42,889 collect their DNA. 1564 00:46:43,128 --> 00:46:44,590 And then again, 1565 00:46:44,630 --> 00:46:46,251 goes to the questions around retention, 1566 00:46:46,751 --> 00:46:48,391 goes to the questions 1567 00:46:48,411 --> 00:46:50,652 around who has access to that information, 1568 00:46:52,032 --> 00:46:52,914 whether that'll be 1569 00:46:52,954 --> 00:46:55,414 available to a private entity that then 1570 00:46:56,128 --> 00:46:59,112 might use it to profit from. 1571 00:47:00,333 --> 00:47:01,434 And so everything having to 1572 00:47:01,474 --> 00:47:02,637 do with collection of 1573 00:47:02,976 --> 00:47:04,518 biometrics in this sense, 1574 00:47:04,579 --> 00:47:06,380 I think raises a lot of 1575 00:47:06,561 --> 00:47:07,862 questions and alarm for me. 1576 00:47:08,242 --> 00:47:09,744 And especially as we're 1577 00:47:09,844 --> 00:47:12,126 seeing that there have been 1578 00:47:12,268 --> 00:47:14,429 so many breaches that even 1579 00:47:14,449 --> 00:47:15,590 the government can't control. 1580 00:47:16,251 --> 00:47:19,094 that the data set here is so 1581 00:47:19,193 --> 00:47:22,036 rich and could also be used 1582 00:47:22,056 --> 00:47:23,737 for discriminatory practices. 1583 00:47:23,838 --> 00:47:26,360 I believe in a move where 1584 00:47:26,440 --> 00:47:27,760 the slippery slope tends to 1585 00:47:27,780 --> 00:47:29,862 be criminalization and 1586 00:47:29,963 --> 00:47:31,744 targeting of individuals. 1587 00:47:31,804 --> 00:47:33,306 And so that's one of the 1588 00:47:33,826 --> 00:47:35,186 things that mostly concerns 1589 00:47:35,226 --> 00:47:36,809 me as we move forward 1590 00:47:36,849 --> 00:47:38,269 around border enforcement measures. 1591 00:47:39,556 --> 00:47:40,157 Yeah, 1592 00:47:40,197 --> 00:47:42,318 EFF has written a lot about DNA 1593 00:47:42,398 --> 00:47:42,878 collection, 1594 00:47:42,978 --> 00:47:45,018 and it's obviously incredibly troubling, 1595 00:47:45,057 --> 00:47:45,679 in part because it's 1596 00:47:46,018 --> 00:47:47,378 predicated on the idea that 1597 00:47:47,739 --> 00:47:48,478 immigrants in the United 1598 00:47:48,518 --> 00:47:51,619 States are more inclined to commit crimes, 1599 00:47:51,639 --> 00:47:53,681 and therefore we must have all this DNA, 1600 00:47:53,701 --> 00:47:56,061 which is just patently obviously untrue, 1601 00:47:56,121 --> 00:47:57,822 and no statistics support that fact. 1602 00:47:58,501 --> 00:47:59,621 Todd? 1603 00:48:01,222 --> 00:48:02,802 Yeah, just two quick ones. 1604 00:48:03,282 --> 00:48:05,903 One goes along the lie detector from 1605 00:48:07,376 --> 00:48:08,476 Petra that Petra mentioned, 1606 00:48:08,496 --> 00:48:09,137 but the one that was 1607 00:48:09,157 --> 00:48:10,876 developed at the University of Arizona, 1608 00:48:11,237 --> 00:48:12,456 right where I live here in Tucson. 1609 00:48:12,976 --> 00:48:15,478 And it was called the Avatar Kiosk. 1610 00:48:15,498 --> 00:48:17,137 And you put your finger in it, I think, 1611 00:48:17,338 --> 00:48:19,599 and then it tests your physiological, 1612 00:48:20,599 --> 00:48:21,579 different physiological 1613 00:48:21,938 --> 00:48:22,960 states that you are in. 1614 00:48:23,340 --> 00:48:23,940 And I thought that was the 1615 00:48:23,960 --> 00:48:24,840 most ridiculous thing 1616 00:48:24,860 --> 00:48:26,420 because people get nervous 1617 00:48:26,519 --> 00:48:29,320 around immigration control 1618 00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:30,121 no matter what. 1619 00:48:30,340 --> 00:48:32,961 And this kind of terror of 1620 00:48:34,079 --> 00:48:37,443 facing somebody is very omnipresent. 1621 00:48:37,623 --> 00:48:39,425 And also as well, 1622 00:48:39,485 --> 00:48:40,505 along with some of the 1623 00:48:40,525 --> 00:48:41,666 things that Petra was mentioning. 1624 00:48:41,967 --> 00:48:43,489 And one quick thing about the RoboDog, 1625 00:48:45,065 --> 00:48:46,246 I talked extensively with 1626 00:48:46,326 --> 00:48:47,246 one of the vendors of the 1627 00:48:47,266 --> 00:48:49,208 RoboDog for ghost robotics. 1628 00:48:50,168 --> 00:48:52,489 And ghost robotics, what was their slogan? 1629 00:48:53,070 --> 00:48:55,891 It's robots that feel the world. 1630 00:48:56,311 --> 00:48:57,532 That's their slogan. 1631 00:48:58,193 --> 00:48:58,873 But he showed me, 1632 00:48:59,074 --> 00:49:00,835 he started showing me how 1633 00:49:00,954 --> 00:49:02,036 you could weaponize the 1634 00:49:02,076 --> 00:49:04,237 RoboDog and insert a machine gun on it. 1635 00:49:04,726 --> 00:49:05,967 And then he showed me like 1636 00:49:06,248 --> 00:49:07,628 how they use the algorithms 1637 00:49:07,708 --> 00:49:09,231 and artificial intelligence. 1638 00:49:09,911 --> 00:49:10,791 And, uh, 1639 00:49:10,831 --> 00:49:12,393 so he was showing me on his phone 1640 00:49:12,632 --> 00:49:14,195 and a tablet on a tablet 1641 00:49:14,735 --> 00:49:16,677 and showing a robo dog that 1642 00:49:16,717 --> 00:49:17,677 was wandering about. 1643 00:49:17,838 --> 00:49:18,617 And then all of a sudden all 1644 00:49:18,637 --> 00:49:21,621 these red squares were appearing and said, 1645 00:49:21,721 --> 00:49:25,202 oh yeah, the AI is detecting targets. 1646 00:49:25,284 --> 00:49:25,864 And then I looked, 1647 00:49:26,304 --> 00:49:28,005 he probably saw my look of astonishment. 1648 00:49:28,065 --> 00:49:29,887 Cause then he said, don't worry. 1649 00:49:29,967 --> 00:49:32,268 You know, we, we pulled the trigger. 1650 00:49:32,509 --> 00:49:33,250 We, but the. 1651 00:49:33,637 --> 00:49:36,043 So that kind of sort of combination of AI, 1652 00:49:36,423 --> 00:49:38,268 the RoboDog drone thing, 1653 00:49:38,487 --> 00:49:40,411 and the sort of terror that 1654 00:49:40,472 --> 00:49:44,900 just accompanies all of this. 1655 00:49:44,981 --> 00:49:45,242 Yeah. 1656 00:49:46,367 --> 00:49:48,090 So here's a really interesting question. 1657 00:49:49,349 --> 00:49:50,851 What regions or communities 1658 00:49:50,992 --> 00:49:51,972 on the border should we be 1659 00:49:52,012 --> 00:49:53,293 talking more about? 1660 00:49:54,213 --> 00:49:55,394 And I will open this up 1661 00:49:55,635 --> 00:49:57,016 beyond the U.S.-Mexico border, 1662 00:49:57,056 --> 00:49:57,496 if you'd like, 1663 00:49:57,536 --> 00:49:58,277 if you want to talk about 1664 00:49:58,577 --> 00:49:59,418 the Canadian border, 1665 00:49:59,438 --> 00:50:00,438 if you want to talk about 1666 00:50:01,179 --> 00:50:02,599 Europe or somewhere else in the world. 1667 00:50:03,179 --> 00:50:04,240 So what regions, 1668 00:50:04,320 --> 00:50:05,822 what border regions do you 1669 00:50:05,862 --> 00:50:06,682 think people aren't talking 1670 00:50:06,702 --> 00:50:07,603 enough about that we should 1671 00:50:07,623 --> 00:50:08,643 be paying more attention to? 1672 00:50:08,684 --> 00:50:10,105 Let's start with you, Pedro. 1673 00:50:14,153 --> 00:50:14,655 I would say from the 1674 00:50:14,695 --> 00:50:16,215 perspective of the US-Mexico border, 1675 00:50:16,275 --> 00:50:18,016 I would say areas that have 1676 00:50:18,097 --> 00:50:19,577 fewer organizations that 1677 00:50:19,637 --> 00:50:22,278 are concerned outright and 1678 00:50:22,318 --> 00:50:23,500 are not as well resourced 1679 00:50:23,539 --> 00:50:25,181 to address these issues. 1680 00:50:25,201 --> 00:50:26,862 So if we look at California, for instance, 1681 00:50:27,141 --> 00:50:29,184 the Imperial County just 1682 00:50:29,244 --> 00:50:30,344 does not have the same 1683 00:50:30,423 --> 00:50:31,485 support networks that one 1684 00:50:31,505 --> 00:50:33,405 would want to have and 1685 00:50:33,606 --> 00:50:35,708 tends to be overlooked when it comes to 1686 00:50:36,467 --> 00:50:38,108 funding tends to be 1687 00:50:38,628 --> 00:50:39,909 overlooked when it comes to 1688 00:50:40,449 --> 00:50:41,849 even just resources. 1689 00:50:42,070 --> 00:50:43,391 There's the Imperial County 1690 00:50:44,891 --> 00:50:45,992 detention facility that's 1691 00:50:46,032 --> 00:50:47,432 located there that's much 1692 00:50:47,492 --> 00:50:48,813 more difficult to access, 1693 00:50:48,893 --> 00:50:50,733 even for attorneys who are 1694 00:50:50,753 --> 00:50:51,675 representing people that 1695 00:50:51,715 --> 00:50:52,474 are detained there. 1696 00:50:52,514 --> 00:50:54,335 And so being able to access 1697 00:50:54,356 --> 00:50:56,356 these remote areas where 1698 00:50:56,376 --> 00:50:59,657 there aren't a lot of resources and 1699 00:51:00,389 --> 00:51:01,733 and where poverty tends to 1700 00:51:01,773 --> 00:51:04,757 be a bigger real life issue 1701 00:51:04,797 --> 00:51:07,483 that impacts people's daily lives. 1702 00:51:08,143 --> 00:51:09,226 And where I would see then 1703 00:51:09,855 --> 00:51:10,835 implementation of 1704 00:51:11,135 --> 00:51:12,318 surveillance technologies 1705 00:51:12,358 --> 00:51:15,159 becomes an easier way of 1706 00:51:15,960 --> 00:51:17,802 pushing where there isn't 1707 00:51:17,862 --> 00:51:19,684 as much resistance 1708 00:51:19,844 --> 00:51:21,726 precisely because the 1709 00:51:21,766 --> 00:51:23,389 resources aren't there to 1710 00:51:23,628 --> 00:51:24,809 resist that technology. 1711 00:51:25,030 --> 00:51:26,311 I've been in conversation 1712 00:51:26,871 --> 00:51:28,012 with colleagues there in 1713 00:51:28,052 --> 00:51:30,356 the past and just the amount of 1714 00:51:31,077 --> 00:51:32,599 of support that they need is tremendous. 1715 00:51:32,659 --> 00:51:34,141 And oftentimes we aren't 1716 00:51:34,201 --> 00:51:35,443 able to provide that support, 1717 00:51:36,023 --> 00:51:37,123 but they don't necessarily 1718 00:51:37,164 --> 00:51:38,606 have the resources to move 1719 00:51:39,427 --> 00:51:40,226 forward in the way that 1720 00:51:40,246 --> 00:51:40,907 they would want to. 1721 00:51:42,809 --> 00:51:46,454 Todd? 1722 00:51:46,614 --> 00:51:47,494 Plenty of places to say. 1723 00:51:47,594 --> 00:51:49,817 I might say both the 1724 00:51:50,237 --> 00:51:52,119 US-Canada border and also 1725 00:51:52,219 --> 00:51:54,461 the Mexico-Guatemala border. 1726 00:51:54,992 --> 00:51:56,733 a U.S.-Canada border in the 1727 00:51:56,793 --> 00:51:58,175 sense that you're in the 1728 00:51:58,695 --> 00:51:59,615 hundred mile zones. 1729 00:51:59,876 --> 00:52:02,677 I did some research in some 1730 00:52:02,737 --> 00:52:04,059 counties right along the 1731 00:52:05,260 --> 00:52:08,182 New York border on Lake Ontario and 1732 00:52:09,206 --> 00:52:10,527 And like farm workers, 1733 00:52:10,748 --> 00:52:12,028 undocumented farm workers 1734 00:52:12,289 --> 00:52:13,530 were getting targeted by 1735 00:52:13,610 --> 00:52:14,451 border patrol who were 1736 00:52:14,510 --> 00:52:15,251 operating in the area 1737 00:52:15,291 --> 00:52:16,293 because of the border, 1738 00:52:16,353 --> 00:52:17,034 but they were actually 1739 00:52:17,074 --> 00:52:18,375 doing internal enforcement. 1740 00:52:18,715 --> 00:52:20,757 And also the consistent 1741 00:52:20,777 --> 00:52:23,858 presence in Amtrak stations 1742 00:52:23,878 --> 00:52:25,039 and Greyhound stations and 1743 00:52:25,059 --> 00:52:25,840 looking for people. 1744 00:52:26,793 --> 00:52:27,675 all along the border. 1745 00:52:27,755 --> 00:52:28,675 And there's technology. 1746 00:52:28,735 --> 00:52:30,436 You have the different 1747 00:52:30,476 --> 00:52:33,297 camera systems and those sorts of things. 1748 00:52:34,777 --> 00:52:36,097 And also that I would say 1749 00:52:36,137 --> 00:52:37,298 Mexico-Guatemala border too, 1750 00:52:37,338 --> 00:52:37,998 because the U.S. 1751 00:52:38,018 --> 00:52:39,380 border's extension, 1752 00:52:39,780 --> 00:52:41,521 that extension of the U.S. 1753 00:52:41,561 --> 00:52:41,920 border, 1754 00:52:41,960 --> 00:52:46,023 the propelling of it into Mexico 1755 00:52:46,682 --> 00:52:50,103 and its training and resource transfers, 1756 00:52:50,123 --> 00:52:51,485 including technologies to 1757 00:52:51,505 --> 00:52:53,226 the Mexican government in 1758 00:52:53,246 --> 00:52:54,865 the South and how that's 1759 00:52:54,905 --> 00:52:55,887 become one of the big, 1760 00:52:56,367 --> 00:52:58,228 huge, I guess you can call it, 1761 00:52:58,268 --> 00:52:59,608 fronts of the US border. 1762 00:53:00,130 --> 00:53:01,431 Those are two places I would 1763 00:53:01,891 --> 00:53:03,092 definitely keep an eye on, 1764 00:53:03,172 --> 00:53:04,251 especially going forward in 1765 00:53:04,271 --> 00:53:05,233 the Trump administration, 1766 00:53:05,273 --> 00:53:07,914 since a lot of focus is 1767 00:53:08,094 --> 00:53:10,476 only in certain places. 1768 00:53:10,597 --> 00:53:11,097 And Petra? 1769 00:53:12,438 --> 00:53:13,338 And I would actually broaden 1770 00:53:13,378 --> 00:53:14,760 it out even further and 1771 00:53:15,101 --> 00:53:16,302 maybe remind us of the 1772 00:53:16,362 --> 00:53:18,085 linkages between border 1773 00:53:18,125 --> 00:53:19,106 violence and border 1774 00:53:19,146 --> 00:53:20,789 subjugation and spaces of 1775 00:53:20,849 --> 00:53:23,291 occupation like Palestine, like Kashmir, 1776 00:53:23,351 --> 00:53:24,813 but also ongoing conflicts 1777 00:53:24,853 --> 00:53:25,994 in Sudan and Congo. 1778 00:53:26,034 --> 00:53:27,356 I mean, this is all tied to 1779 00:53:27,931 --> 00:53:29,391 a particular world order 1780 00:53:29,552 --> 00:53:30,932 that's predicated again on 1781 00:53:31,132 --> 00:53:32,373 massive power differentials. 1782 00:53:32,432 --> 00:53:33,632 And there's also another 1783 00:53:33,672 --> 00:53:34,353 element which we haven't 1784 00:53:34,373 --> 00:53:35,092 really touched on and 1785 00:53:35,112 --> 00:53:36,213 that's the labor element. 1786 00:53:36,293 --> 00:53:38,673 The fact that AI and labor 1787 00:53:38,853 --> 00:53:39,994 really go hand in hand when 1788 00:53:40,034 --> 00:53:42,094 we think about how much 1789 00:53:42,795 --> 00:53:44,155 data we need to actually 1790 00:53:44,215 --> 00:53:45,655 power a lot of the systems 1791 00:53:45,695 --> 00:53:47,815 that the global north relies on. 1792 00:53:48,175 --> 00:53:49,115 And much of this labor 1793 00:53:49,155 --> 00:53:52,297 happens in places like East Africa, 1794 00:53:52,336 --> 00:53:54,077 for example, Bangladesh, India. 1795 00:53:54,556 --> 00:53:55,838 where people are doing 1796 00:53:55,898 --> 00:53:56,858 really terrible work, 1797 00:53:56,918 --> 00:53:58,019 either when it comes to 1798 00:53:59,260 --> 00:54:01,503 content moderation or data 1799 00:54:01,543 --> 00:54:04,065 exploitation and other ways for pennies, 1800 00:54:04,425 --> 00:54:05,527 not to mention, again, 1801 00:54:05,547 --> 00:54:07,307 the kind of just 1802 00:54:07,427 --> 00:54:08,668 geopolitics that go into 1803 00:54:08,708 --> 00:54:09,849 what people have rightly 1804 00:54:09,889 --> 00:54:12,032 called neocolonialism or 1805 00:54:12,072 --> 00:54:14,134 data colonialism in these spaces. 1806 00:54:14,293 --> 00:54:15,315 So labor issues, I think, 1807 00:54:15,355 --> 00:54:16,456 are also important to think about. 1808 00:54:17,762 --> 00:54:19,222 Yeah, excellent. 1809 00:54:19,282 --> 00:54:19,744 Thank you. 1810 00:54:20,264 --> 00:54:21,045 And we're going to move to 1811 00:54:21,085 --> 00:54:22,286 the final question now and 1812 00:54:22,306 --> 00:54:25,289 hopefully end on a little bit of hope, 1813 00:54:25,309 --> 00:54:26,710 which is the question is, 1814 00:54:26,809 --> 00:54:27,811 what are the most important 1815 00:54:27,831 --> 00:54:28,791 things we can do right now 1816 00:54:28,811 --> 00:54:30,132 to protect vulnerable 1817 00:54:30,152 --> 00:54:31,974 communities or encourage 1818 00:54:32,054 --> 00:54:33,235 change at the border? 1819 00:54:33,695 --> 00:54:35,438 And I'll broaden that also to say, 1820 00:54:35,757 --> 00:54:35,998 you know, 1821 00:54:36,338 --> 00:54:38,159 what are efforts that you see 1822 00:54:38,219 --> 00:54:39,161 happening right now that 1823 00:54:39,181 --> 00:54:40,983 are kind of giving you hope? 1824 00:54:41,402 --> 00:54:42,184 Petra, we'll start with you. 1825 00:54:45,878 --> 00:54:48,940 I would say that as much as possible, 1826 00:54:49,521 --> 00:54:50,081 something that we've been 1827 00:54:50,121 --> 00:54:52,905 doing has been hosting Know 1828 00:54:52,945 --> 00:54:54,266 Your Rights presentations. 1829 00:54:54,726 --> 00:54:55,927 And the Know Your Rights presentations, 1830 00:54:55,967 --> 00:54:56,447 typically, 1831 00:54:57,489 --> 00:55:00,010 these were being held with 1832 00:55:00,512 --> 00:55:02,592 undocumented community members. 1833 00:55:02,653 --> 00:55:03,755 But now, I mean, 1834 00:55:03,775 --> 00:55:06,336 the interest is so vast 1835 00:55:06,376 --> 00:55:09,320 that we're doing presentations to schools, 1836 00:55:09,380 --> 00:55:11,902 to churches, to even museums. 1837 00:55:12,382 --> 00:55:14,103 people that understand that 1838 00:55:14,123 --> 00:55:15,744 the implications of when 1839 00:55:15,885 --> 00:55:17,606 some specific individuals 1840 00:55:17,646 --> 00:55:18,547 are targeted because they 1841 00:55:18,588 --> 00:55:20,528 have a different 1842 00:55:21,228 --> 00:55:23,291 relationship with the nation state, 1843 00:55:23,710 --> 00:55:24,751 that they too can be 1844 00:55:24,851 --> 00:55:26,152 eventually targeted as 1845 00:55:26,213 --> 00:55:27,273 we've seen in different 1846 00:55:27,293 --> 00:55:28,954 cases around the country. 1847 00:55:29,454 --> 00:55:32,077 And so as much as we're able 1848 00:55:32,117 --> 00:55:33,458 to generalize the concept 1849 00:55:33,478 --> 00:55:35,340 that we have rights and 1850 00:55:35,360 --> 00:55:37,101 that we have the ability to 1851 00:55:37,240 --> 00:55:38,382 enforce those rights and to 1852 00:55:38,541 --> 00:55:39,563 exert those rights 1853 00:55:40,043 --> 00:55:42,945 in moments where they might be questioned. 1854 00:55:43,005 --> 00:55:44,545 I think that offers some 1855 00:55:44,606 --> 00:55:46,588 hope for people that might 1856 00:55:46,608 --> 00:55:47,148 be in a much more 1857 00:55:47,168 --> 00:55:48,369 vulnerable situation to be 1858 00:55:48,409 --> 00:55:50,150 able to defend those rights. 1859 00:55:50,170 --> 00:55:50,811 So what we say, 1860 00:55:50,851 --> 00:55:52,331 it's not only important to 1861 00:55:52,371 --> 00:55:53,253 know what your rights are, 1862 00:55:53,632 --> 00:55:55,735 but understand how to defend them. 1863 00:55:57,476 --> 00:55:57,775 Yes. 1864 00:55:58,135 --> 00:55:58,856 And from what I understand, 1865 00:55:58,876 --> 00:56:00,217 those trainings around the 1866 00:56:00,237 --> 00:56:00,838 country have been 1867 00:56:01,818 --> 00:56:04,760 particularly effective in some places. 1868 00:56:04,780 --> 00:56:05,362 Yeah. 1869 00:56:05,382 --> 00:56:05,641 Petra. 1870 00:56:09,115 --> 00:56:11,119 I think what gives me hope 1871 00:56:11,278 --> 00:56:14,443 is to also think about who 1872 00:56:14,483 --> 00:56:16,206 actually gets to determine 1873 00:56:16,226 --> 00:56:17,626 what we innovate on and why, 1874 00:56:17,748 --> 00:56:19,088 and who gets to imagine a 1875 00:56:19,128 --> 00:56:19,809 different world. 1876 00:56:19,909 --> 00:56:20,731 And a lot of this, I think, 1877 00:56:20,771 --> 00:56:21,833 is actually conversations 1878 00:56:21,873 --> 00:56:23,554 about also who counts as an expert. 1879 00:56:24,115 --> 00:56:25,998 We really need to make space 1880 00:56:26,057 --> 00:56:27,559 for expertise that is 1881 00:56:27,619 --> 00:56:28,920 coming from the ground and 1882 00:56:28,960 --> 00:56:29,740 coming from affected 1883 00:56:29,780 --> 00:56:31,302 communities first and foremost. 1884 00:56:32,342 --> 00:56:32,943 This is something that we 1885 00:56:32,983 --> 00:56:33,744 try and do in one of the 1886 00:56:33,784 --> 00:56:35,106 projects we incubate at the 1887 00:56:35,126 --> 00:56:36,206 refugee law lab called the 1888 00:56:36,246 --> 00:56:37,568 Migration Technology Monitor, 1889 00:56:37,648 --> 00:56:38,367 where we work with 1890 00:56:38,407 --> 00:56:39,389 colleagues on the move who 1891 00:56:39,449 --> 00:56:40,811 are currently in situations 1892 00:56:40,831 --> 00:56:41,610 of displacement, 1893 00:56:41,731 --> 00:56:42,972 doing their own work on 1894 00:56:43,052 --> 00:56:44,954 borders and surveillance and technology. 1895 00:56:45,454 --> 00:56:46,375 Because it is also the 1896 00:56:46,434 --> 00:56:47,356 politics of knowledge 1897 00:56:47,396 --> 00:56:49,217 production and who gets to, again, 1898 00:56:49,518 --> 00:56:51,360 take up space to talk about these issues. 1899 00:56:52,480 --> 00:56:53,481 And I think we can and 1900 00:56:53,521 --> 00:56:54,581 should work differently 1901 00:56:55,541 --> 00:56:56,282 because there's so much 1902 00:56:56,342 --> 00:56:58,023 expertise that's on the ground already. 1903 00:56:59,364 --> 00:56:59,585 Yeah, 1904 00:56:59,684 --> 00:57:01,206 and I think that's one of the things 1905 00:57:01,266 --> 00:57:03,648 that motivated us to spend 1906 00:57:03,708 --> 00:57:05,708 a lot of time on both sides 1907 00:57:05,728 --> 00:57:06,570 of the border talking to 1908 00:57:06,630 --> 00:57:08,010 people and hearing from 1909 00:57:08,291 --> 00:57:09,731 people who are very much 1910 00:57:10,112 --> 00:57:11,592 experts and will know more 1911 00:57:11,672 --> 00:57:13,153 about the power and 1912 00:57:13,293 --> 00:57:15,014 differentials in the border 1913 00:57:15,114 --> 00:57:15,614 and about border 1914 00:57:15,635 --> 00:57:18,277 surveillance than I ever will. 1915 00:57:18,456 --> 00:57:19,697 Yeah, Todd. 1916 00:57:22,679 --> 00:57:23,800 I mean, honestly, I mean, 1917 00:57:23,820 --> 00:57:25,981 all the work that all of you are doing, 1918 00:57:26,362 --> 00:57:28,043 like what Petro has just mentioned, 1919 00:57:28,063 --> 00:57:31,887 Migration Technology Monitor, and Pedro, 1920 00:57:31,907 --> 00:57:33,708 what Pedro does at AFSC, 1921 00:57:34,068 --> 00:57:35,429 and what you do at EFF. 1922 00:57:35,570 --> 00:57:35,769 I mean, 1923 00:57:35,809 --> 00:57:38,431 those are some seriously really 1924 00:57:38,452 --> 00:57:42,135 important examples of pushing back. 1925 00:57:42,516 --> 00:57:43,996 And I just want to say also, 1926 00:57:44,356 --> 00:57:46,099 when you take the border 1927 00:57:46,139 --> 00:57:47,659 systems internationally and 1928 00:57:47,699 --> 00:57:49,521 look at them for what they are, 1929 00:57:49,822 --> 00:57:50,682 I can see them as... 1930 00:57:51,322 --> 00:57:52,965 like this massive 1931 00:57:53,005 --> 00:57:55,608 scaffolding of for a status 1932 00:57:55,648 --> 00:57:58,170 quo of a of an unjust world 1933 00:57:58,351 --> 00:57:59,693 right there's a one way 1934 00:57:59,733 --> 00:58:00,673 that this unjust world 1935 00:58:00,713 --> 00:58:03,217 keeps on going forth and 1936 00:58:03,557 --> 00:58:05,519 the importance I see of um 1937 00:58:06,661 --> 00:58:08,983 of you know of certainly 1938 00:58:09,023 --> 00:58:10,222 that's sort of undermining 1939 00:58:10,262 --> 00:58:11,422 that and maybe that's 1940 00:58:11,463 --> 00:58:13,603 through a lot of you know 1941 00:58:13,664 --> 00:58:14,684 what petro is talking about 1942 00:58:14,784 --> 00:58:17,224 in terms of cross-border 1943 00:58:18,085 --> 00:58:19,246 collaborations and 1944 00:58:19,286 --> 00:58:21,226 movements and solidarity 1945 00:58:21,346 --> 00:58:22,927 and that those the sort of 1946 00:58:23,086 --> 00:58:23,827 I think the sort of 1947 00:58:23,927 --> 00:58:26,947 internationalization of movements is 1948 00:58:27,639 --> 00:58:28,922 is you can see it here and 1949 00:58:28,942 --> 00:58:30,063 there in different 1950 00:58:30,103 --> 00:58:32,324 collaborations and that's I 1951 00:58:32,364 --> 00:58:34,126 think that that that gives 1952 00:58:34,188 --> 00:58:35,768 me you know that would give 1953 00:58:35,809 --> 00:58:37,070 me the most hope going 1954 00:58:37,110 --> 00:58:38,411 forward that's those sorts 1955 00:58:38,452 --> 00:58:40,353 of challenges to this 1956 00:58:40,534 --> 00:58:41,695 structure of borders that 1957 00:58:41,735 --> 00:58:42,936 we find ourselves in right 1958 00:58:42,976 --> 00:58:46,922 now yeah well thank you so much 1959 00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:48,442 for being here and coming to 1960 00:58:48,501 --> 00:58:51,143 talk about this and for 1961 00:58:51,463 --> 00:58:52,824 acknowledging the work that 1962 00:58:52,983 --> 00:58:54,724 EFF has been doing over the 1963 00:58:54,846 --> 00:58:57,766 last few years and the new 1964 00:58:57,827 --> 00:58:59,327 exhibit that is coming out 1965 00:58:59,387 --> 00:59:00,929 right now that just opened 1966 00:59:00,969 --> 00:59:01,849 on Angel Island. 1967 00:59:02,230 --> 00:59:04,150 And I hope somehow all of 1968 00:59:04,170 --> 00:59:05,431 you will get a chance to go 1969 00:59:05,847 --> 00:59:06,869 take the ferry out to Angel 1970 00:59:06,909 --> 00:59:08,050 Islands and see it. 1971 00:59:08,489 --> 00:59:11,172 But that's all that we have time for. 1972 00:59:11,192 --> 00:59:13,353 I want to officially thank Dave, Todd, 1973 00:59:13,434 --> 00:59:15,275 Pedro, and Petra for joining us today. 1974 00:59:15,695 --> 00:59:16,976 And thank you all to 1975 00:59:17,036 --> 00:59:18,297 everyone who contributed to 1976 00:59:18,318 --> 00:59:19,478 the discussion in the chat 1977 00:59:19,778 --> 00:59:20,820 and all the great questions 1978 00:59:20,840 --> 00:59:22,661 and everybody watching today. 1979 00:59:23,282 --> 00:59:24,862 Digital rights begin with you. 1980 00:59:25,282 --> 00:59:27,025 EFF has been a leader in privacy, 1981 00:59:27,065 --> 00:59:28,445 freedom of expression, 1982 00:59:28,865 --> 00:59:30,547 and innovation for thirty four years, 1983 00:59:30,626 --> 00:59:31,668 and we need your help to 1984 00:59:31,728 --> 00:59:32,648 keep up the fight. 1985 00:59:33,009 --> 00:59:34,148 So please become a member 1986 00:59:34,210 --> 00:59:37,110 today at EFF.org slash border support. 1987 00:59:37,632 --> 00:59:39,253 A new URL just for today. 1988 00:59:39,853 --> 00:59:41,074 We hope you will continue 1989 00:59:41,134 --> 00:59:42,135 these conversations with 1990 00:59:42,155 --> 00:59:42,875 your civil liberties, 1991 00:59:43,454 --> 00:59:44,436 with your civil liberties 1992 00:59:45,197 --> 00:59:46,777 colleagues and your friends. 1993 00:59:47,097 --> 00:59:47,978 Be sure to keep an eye out 1994 00:59:48,018 --> 00:59:49,659 for future events by 1995 00:59:49,699 --> 00:59:51,621 visiting EFF.org slash events. 1996 00:59:51,740 --> 00:59:53,121 And thank you all for joining. 1997 00:59:53,181 --> 00:59:54,922 And we'll see you next time 1998 00:59:55,682 --> 00:59:57,824 for another EFF live event. 1999 00:59:58,365 --> 00:59:58,889 Thank you all.